

89-458^①



No. _____

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1989

ROYCE BODDIE BADGER,
Petitioner

vs.—

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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Attorney for Petitioner,
ROYCE BODDIE BADGER

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WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRS WHEN IT FAILS TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT A PERSON CANNOT FORM A CONSPIRACY WITH A GOVERNMENT AGENT.

II.

WHETHER THE LANGUAGE IN AN ENTRAPMENT INSTRUCTION SUBSTANTIALLY COVERS AN OMITTED CHARGE THAT A PERSON CANNOT CONSPIRE WITH A GOVERNMENT AGENT, SO THAT THE DEFENDANT'S ABILITY TO MAKE A DEFENSE IS NOT IMPAIRED.

III.

WHETHER A DEFENDANT IS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN HE IS CONVICTED OF CONSPIRING TO POSSESS COCAINE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, AND THE GOVERNMENT FAILS TO CHARGE SPECIFICALLY AS TO A ONE-HALF OUNCE AMOUNT OR A FOUR-KILOGRAM AMOUNT, BOTH AMOUNTS AS TO WHICH THERE IS EVIDENCE, AND THE JURY FAILS TO RESOLVE THE LACK OF CLARITY AS TO AMOUNT, AND THE DEFENDANT IS SENTENCED FOR THE GREATER AMOUNT.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT
FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT A PERSON
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II.

2. WHETHER THE LANGUAGE IN AN ENTRAPMENT
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CHARGE THAT A PERSON CANNOT CONSPIRE WITH A
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III.

3. WHETHER A DEFENDANT IS DENIED DUE
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JURISDICTION

On April 10, 1989, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that petitioner's conviction was affirmed per curiam. Within twenty days, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied on June 20, 1989. This petition was filed from Decatur, Georgia on January 18, 1989, and filed within sixty days of June 20,

United States v. Young, 444 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1971)
 United States v. Young, 444 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1971)

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OPINIONS ISSUED BELOW

The timely suggestion for rehearing en banc to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was denied on June 20, 1989 and is not reported. On April 10, 1989, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that petitioner's conviction was affirmed per curiam and is reported at 874 F.2d 820.

On June 13, 1988, a jury in the Northern District of Georgia, found petitioner guilty on conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute. A decision was not reported.

JURISDICTION

On April 10, 1989, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that petitioner's conviction was affirmed per curiam. Within twenty days, petitioner filed a suggestion for re-hearing en banc, which was denied on June 20, 1989. This petition was mailed from Decatur, Georgia on August 18, 1989, and filed within sixty days of June 20,

OPINIONS ISSUED WITHIN

The timely execution for releasing

an order to the United States Court of

Appeals for the District Court was denied

on June 20, 1967 and is not reported.

April 10, 1967, the United States Court of

Appeals for the District Court ruled that

petitioner's conviction was affirmed for

reasons and is reported at 374 F.2d 1010

on June 11, 1967, 3 days in the

Western District of Kansas, Kansas

petitioner's conviction is affirmed

and is reported at 374 F.2d 1010.

THE COURT

In April 10, 1967, the United States

Court of Appeals for the District Court

ruled that petitioner's conviction was

affirmed and is reported at 374 F.2d 1010.

Petitioner filed a suggestion for

certiorari on June 10, 1967 and earlier on

June 10, 1967. This petition was denied

on June 10, 1967. The petition was denied

and is reported at 374 F.2d 1010.

1989. This court's jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

1. The 5th Amendment due process clause provides:

"No person shall be...deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law..."

2. 21 U.S.C. 846 provides:

Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this title (21 U.S.C.) shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or the conspiracy.

3. 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) provides:

"841(a)...it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally - (1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance..."

4. 8 U.S.C. 3553B provides:

"(b)...The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the sentencing commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On June 13, 1988, after a jury trial in the District Court of the Northern District of Georgia, Petitioner was convicted of one count of conspiracy to

possess cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. [Appendix p. (7)] and found not guilty of the substantive offenses of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute and simple possession. He was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.

On appeal a panel of the court of appeals affirmed the conviction [Appendix p. (2)]. A petition for rehearing en banc was denied [Appendix page (3)]. The following summary is taken from the pleadings and transcript of the proceedings in the District Court of the Northern District of Georgia.

On March 13, 1988, Gregory Leroy James was arrested in south Georgia en route from Florida to Atlanta with four kilograms of cocaine in his car (R3-28). Upon his arrest, he informed police that he was delivering the cocaine to a customer in Atlanta. The police charged James with trafficking in cocaine (R3-35). They then made a deal with James in which James was

promised a lighter sentence if he cooperated with the police (R3-55, R4-48, 53). James agreed to do so, to become a government agent and attempt to deliver the cocaine to his customer in Atlanta.

When James arrived in Atlanta, he was outfitted with a taping device to record the proceedings, and he was briefed extensively by police officers (R3-75, 76). Due to a malfunction, the tape was running while the briefing was going on (R3-76), but had run out before the time the controlled delivery was made (R3-111, R4-18). Because the tape was running, there is a record of James being threatened improperly by the police (R3-111, 112, 114, 116). There is, however, no record of the events involving the controlled delivery to Royce Badger, petitioner in this case (R3-111, R4-18).

James was instructed that he should call his customer, arrange to meet him at the prearranged location without naming the place and, at the meeting, let the customer

provided a lighter sentence if he
cooperated with the police (K3-55, K4-55,
51). James agreed to do so, to become a
government agent and attempt to deliver the
opium to his contact in Atlanta.
When James arrived in Atlanta, he was
outfitted with a radio device to monitor
the proceedings, and he was directed
extensively by police officers (K3-71,
72). But in a telephone call the tape was
running and the listening was going on
(K3-71, 72) but not before the tape
the device was broken and was (K3-71,
72-73). The tape was running
there is a record of James being threatened
by the police (K3-71, 72, 73).
But, that is, however, the result of the
events involving the monitored delivery to
James was, therefore, in this case
(K3-71, 72-73).
James was instructed that he should
call his contact, attempt to meet him at
the prearranged location without making the
phone call at the meeting. But the contact

voluntarily take the bag of cocaine from the trunk of James' car (R3-106, R3-82, 105). James then made a phone call to petitioner, who agreed to meet him at a restaurant, which, contrary to instructions, James named (R3-82, 105, R3-76, R4-44-46, 94). There is a tape of the telephone call (RE-55, 56), during which petitioner indicated that he did not know what "stuff" James had for him.

Petitioner contends that he owed James about \$1,500 for one-half ounce of cocaine (R4-89) which he had bought from James about two and one-half weeks previously (R3-118, R4-98, 99). Petitioner contends he paid James \$1,200 at the restaurant (R4-95).

Petitioner, along with Dwan Kornegay, met James at the restaurant. When James and Petitioner went to James' car, James removed the bag from the car and handed it to Petitioner (R4-19, 96). Petitioner alleges that James asked him to hold the bag for James (R4-23). As Petitioner

voluntarily take the bag of cocaine from
the trunk of James' car (83-106, 83-91,
105). James then made a phone call to
petitioner, who agreed to meet him at a
restaurant, which, contrary to
instructions, James used (83-81, 102,
83-91, 92). There is a tape of
the telephone call (83-92, 93, 94) which
petitioner indicated that he did not
know what "status" James had for him.
Petitioner conveyed that he owed James
about \$1,000 for one-half ounce of cocaine
(83-97) which he had bought from James
about two and one-half years prior to James'
(83-106, 94, 95). Petitioner conveyed
he paid James \$1,000 at the restaurant
(83-92).
Petitioner, along with Peter Rodriguez,
went to James at the restaurant. When James
and petitioner went to James' car, James
reminded the two that the car was loaded with
cocaine (83-106, 95). Petitioner
advised that James asked him to join the
bag for James (83-106, 96) as petitioner.

walked away from James' car carrying the bag, police moved in and arrested him. At the moment he realized there were policemen present, Petitioner threw down the gun he was holding but not the bag (R3-85, R4-100). Petitioner testified that he thought his possession of the gun was the reason police were called (R3-85, R4-100).

Petitioner denied any knowledge of the four kilograms of cocaine in James' car. He said that the money he paid James was for a previous purchase of one-half ounce of cocaine (R4-89). He contended he never agreed to pick up anything, but only to pay James money he owed him. He claimed to know nothing of the contents of the bag he held for James (R4-99).

When the charges were given to the jury, defendant's counsel requested two instructions which were denied: (1) That James became a government agent as soon as he made the deal with the police in south Georgia shortly after his arrest, and that a person cannot conspire with a government

knifed away from James' car carrying the
bag, police moved in and arrested him. At
the moment he realized there were policemen
present, Patterson threw down the gun he
was holding but not the bag (12-25).

Patterson testified that he
thought his possession of the gun was the
reason police were called (12-25, 12-26).
Patterson denied any knowledge as to

the true significance of money in James'
car. He said that the money he paid James
was for a previous purchase of one-half
ounce of marijuana (12-25). He mentioned he
never agreed to give up anything, but only
to get more money he owed him. He stated
he knew nothing of the contents of the bag
he held in James' car (12-25).

When the charges were filed in the
court, defendant's counsel requested the
evidences which were denied. At that
time James' government agent was with
him. The deal with the police is known
George's story after his arrest, and that
a federal agent conspired with a government

agent (R1-27-22, R5-70)[App. p. (13-14)]; and (2) That the jury, if they found Petitioner guilty of either charge, should indicate the amount they found Petitioner guilty of possessing or conspiring to possess: the one-half ounce he had previously bought from James, or the four kilograms which were allegedly being delivered to him at the time of his arrest (R1-27-49).

The jury found Petitioner guilty of conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, but not guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. They included charge of simple possession (R1-29). The judge subsequently sentenced Petitioner, per the federal sentencing guidelines, for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute the four kilograms of cocaine (R1-1).

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. In affirming the trial court's refusal to charge the jury that a conspiracy can not be formed with a government agent, the Eleventh Circuit has

agents (RE-37-32, 38-701720, p. 173-174);

and (2) that the jury, in that regard,

testimony given by either source, would

indicate the source was not a reliable

source of information as suggested by

Government. The two-kill source has

previously stated that source, on the

testimony given was allegedly being

delivered to him at the time of his arrest.

(RE-37-32)

The two-kill testimony given by

source is based on the fact that

is accurate, but the quality of the

is source was found to be unreliable.

Source's testimony of this is

(RE-37-32). The source's testimony is

reliable, but the source's testimony

is not reliable as source is not

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departed from its usual course of judicial proceedings and decided an important question of federal law which has not been but should be settled by this court.

In order for Badger to present an adequate defense, it was essential that the jury be charged that James became a government informer at the time he made the deal with the police after his arrest and that Badger could not have formed a conspiracy with James after that time. The Eleventh Circuit has held that one cannot conspire with a government informer who secretly intends to frustrate the conspiracy. United States v. Richardson, 764 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1985).

The indictment did not accuse Badger of conspiring with any person other than Greg James. When James agreed to cooperate with the government, he was no longer subject to punishment for any acts committed commensurate with that agreement.

described from the usual course of industry
exceptional and decided as industrial
matter of interest for which has not been
but which is settled in this court.

In order that better to proceed in
adequate defense it was essential that the
jury be advised that James was not a
government informant at the time he was
dealt with the police after the arrest and
that he was not a spy.
The jury was also told that the
evidence was not sufficient to establish
that the defendant was a spy.
The jury was also told that the
evidence was not sufficient to establish
that the defendant was a spy.

The defendant did not make any
of the evidence of the government's case
that James was a spy.
The government's case was not
sufficient to establish that James was a spy.
The government's case was not
sufficient to establish that James was a spy.

Verdict

Badger was entitled to have the jury charged that any conspiracy with James would have ended after James became a cooperating witness. The jury should have been told that they could have taken into consideration any acts by Badger subsequent to James's becoming an agent for the government as evidence of a prior conspiracy. The failure of the trial Court to give this charge limited Badger's closing argument.

In addition, since James did not testify, the jury was put into a position of possibly accepting the conspiracy theory only on the 14th of March. The trial might have had a completely different result had Badger's attorney been allowed to argue that, for the jury to find Badger guilty on the conspiracy count, the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy was already in effect between the dates of March 9 and March 13, before the meeting at the Williams Seafood Restaurant.

Edgerton was entitled to have the jury

charged that any conspiracy with James

would have ended with James' death.

conspiring witness. The jury should have

been told that they could have taken into

consideration any acts by Edgerton subsequent

to James' death as evidence of a plot.

government as evidence of a plot.

conspiracy. The failure of the trial court

to give this charge limited Edgerton's

possible evidence.

In addition, since James did not

testify, the jury was put into a position

of possibly accepting the conspiracy theory

only on the basis of hearsay. The trial court

have had a conspiracy instruction would not

Edgerton's silence has failed to argue

that, for the jury to find Edgerton guilty on

the conspiracy count, the government has to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the

conspiracy was actually in effect at the time

the date of James' death and that it existed

the meeting at the William Edgerton

Restaurant.

The way the charge was given, the jury was allowed to conclude that the conspiracy occurred on the 14th.

This circuit has repeatedly held that government agents and informants cannot be conspirators. U.S. v. Rodriguez, 765 F.2d 1546, 1552 (11th Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Elledge, 723 F.2d 864, 866 (11th Cir. 1984).

Badger respectfully suggests that, since James could not be punished for his activities on March 14, 1988, he could therefore not be a co-conspirator with Badger on that date. Failure to advise the jury of this fact does Badger irreparable harm at trial.

In United States v. Lively, 803 F.2d 1124 (11th Cir. 1986), the court reversed the conviction of the defendant for conspiracy to distribute cocaine due to the trial court's failure to instruct the jury that a government informer cannot conspire with another. The defendant is entitled to have presented instructions relating to a theory of defense for which there is any

The way the charge was given, the

they was allowed to conclude that the

conspiracy occurred on the 10th.

This circuit has repeatedly held that

government agents and informants cannot be

conspirators. *U.S. v. Williams*, 350 F.2d

1966, 1967 (1st Cir. 1966); *U.S. v.*

Ellison, 753 F.2d 954, 955 (1st Cir. 1985).

Butler respectfully submits that,

since James could not be punished for his

activities on March 14, 1968, he could

therefore not be a co-conspirator with

James on that date. Failure to advise the

jury of this fact would render its verdict

harmful.

In *United States v. Bailey*, 751 F.2d

1124 (1st Cir. 1985), the court reversed

the conviction of the defendant for

conspiracy to distribute and use the

trial court's failure to instruct the jury

that a government informant cannot conspire

with another. The defendant is entitled to

have presented instructions relating to a

lack of defense but such there is no

foundation in the evidence. United States v. Young, 464 F.2d 160, 164 (5th Cir. 1972), citing Tatum v. United States, 190 F.2d 612, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1951).

Following the Stone requirements, the charge requested in this case is clearly correct. The disagreement arises over the question whether the requested instruction was substantially covered by another instruction which was given.

II. In affirming the trial courts refusal to charge the jury on conspiracy with a government agent because it was substantially covered by other jury instructions, seriously departs from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings and calls for an exercise of this court's power of supervision.

The government in this case relies on the entrapment instruction given by the judge as "substantially covering" the charge that a person cannot conspire with a government agent, and that James became a government agent when he made the deal with

Foundation in the evidence. United States
v. Young, 464 F.2d 100, 101 (5th Cir.
1972), citing Tamm v. United States, 100
F.2d 610, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1937).

Following the above requirements, the
charge requested in this case is clearly
correct. The statement arises out of
question whether the requested instruction
was substantially covered by another
instruction which was given.

11. In addition the trial judge
refused to allow the jury to speculate
with a government agent because it was
substantially covered by other jury
instructions. Refusing to speculate is an
instructed and usual source of confusion
and error and calls for an instruction of
this court's power of supervision.

The government in this case failed to
the requested instruction given by the
judge as substantially covering the
charge that a person cannot negotiate with a
government agent, and that James became a
government agent when he made the deal with

the police [App. p. (20-23)]. The entrapment instruction does not mention conspiracy or any of the necessary elements in a proper instruction on the effect of a government informer as a co-conspirator. A simple reading of the entrapment instruction is convincing proof that the charge did not adequately inform the jury of the law they needed to know in order to fairly decide the case. That means Petitioner was deprived of the ability to present an adequate defense to the conspiracy count, the only count on which he was convicted.

The refusal of the 11th Circuit to overturn the denial of an important and proper jury instruction without an opinion explaining their inaction seriously departs from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings and calls for an exercise of this court's power of supervision.

the police [A. P. (130-11)]. The

entirement instruction does not mention
conspiracy or any of the necessary elements
in a proper instruction on the effect of a
government interest as a co-conspirator. A

single reading of the entirement
instruction is convincing proof that the
charge did not adequately inform the jury
of the law they needed to know in order to
fairly decide the case. That same

petitioner was deprived of the ability to
present an adequate defense to the
conspiracy count. The only count in which
he was convicted.

The refusal of the jury to
overturn the denial of an important and
proper jury instruction which in essence
explained their position was clearly
from the accepted and usual course of
judicial procedure and is not to be
excused on the basis of a mere
suggestion.

III. The decision of the Eleventh Circuit is in direct conflict with several of its own opinions regarding critical elements of jury instructions, resulting in the petitioner's violation of due process guaranteed by the Constitution.

Although an ambiguous jury verdict is not reversible error, the unresolved question as to the amount of cocaine for which Badger was convicted in this case denies him due process of law. The government was not clear as to which amount it accused Badger of conspiring with intent to possess -- one-half ounce or four kilograms. While the original indictment charged Badger with conspiring to possess four kilograms of cocaine, the superseding indictment omitted any reference to amount. When the judge refused to charge the jury that, if they convicted Badger, they should state as to which amount they

1. The history of the movement

should be the first subject with regard

to the various movements resulting from

the various of their interactions resulting in

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were convicting him of conspiring to possess, the verdict became so ambiguous that Badger was denied due process in receiving a sentence for conspiracy to possess four kilograms of cocaine.

The defense requested that the court sentence Badger for conspiring to distribute a half-ounce of cocaine with an offense level of 12, Category I, which has a sentencing range of ten to sixteen months.¹ Instead, the court sentenced Badger for conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute four kilograms of cocaine, which placed Badger at an offense level of 32, Category I, with a sentencing range of 121 to 151 months.²

Because of the ambiguity as to the

¹ Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, West Publishing Co. (1988), pages 63, 216.

² Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, West Publishing Co. (1988), pages 62, 216.

11/11/11

amount of cocaine which Badger was convicted of conspiring to possess, Badger was impermissibly denied his constitutional rights under the due process clause of the Constitution to have a jury apply the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to an essential element of the crime with which he was charged.

The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals held in Alvarez 735 F.2d 461 (11th Cir. 1965) that quantity of substance is a critical element of the offense under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841. The general verdict as to conspiracy made it impossible to determine which object the jury found. The government tries to distinguish Alvarez from the present case by contending that proof was only argued and offered for four kilograms of cocaine. The petitioner points out that Alvarez should not be distinguished from his case because there was a substantial amount of evidence presented at trial about a

amount of income which had been
consisted of capitalizing to income. But
was impermissibly denied the constitutional
rights under the due process clause of the
Constitution to have a jury apply the
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
to an essential element of the crime with
which he was charged.

THE STATE'S BURDEN OF PROOF

In the case of *People v. ...*
the State's burden of proof is a
fundamental element of the criminal law.
It is the duty of the State to prove
every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. This burden is
placed on the State by the Constitution.

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every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. This burden is
placed on the State by the Constitution.

presented at this time.

critical element of the offense requiring the jury to determine the amount of cocaine that petitioner conspired to possess.

Badger's original indictment accused him of possession with intent to distribute four kilograms of cocaine (R1-1). The superseding indictment added the conspiracy count and omitted any references as to the amount of the contraband in the indictment (R1-181). During the trial, the defense became concerned that the jury might believe that Badger was not guilty of conspiracy to possess four kilos of cocaine with the intent to distribute and possession of four kilos with intent to distribute, and at the same time possibly convict him on the conspiracy count, based on his admission that he had obtained a half ounce of cocaine from James two and a half weeks previously. (See Argument #1 above.) The defense made a specific request to charge, in writing, at the close

critical element of the offense requiring
the jury to determine the amount of loss in
that particular respect in general.
Petitioner's original indictment required
him to be concerned with intent to defraud
the citizens of the State of Illinois.
The indictment required that the defendant
know and intend to defraud as to the
amount of the contribution to the fund.
The jury found the State of Illinois
incapable of proving that the jury also
believe that the defendant was not guilty of
conspiracy to defraud the State of Illinois
with the intent to defraud the State of Illinois
conspiracy to defraud the State of Illinois as
directly, and to the State of Illinois
conspiracy to defraud the State of Illinois
on the evidence that the State of Illinois
that the State of Illinois was not guilty of
that the State of Illinois was not guilty of
that the State of Illinois was not guilty of
that the State of Illinois was not guilty of

of the evidence, requesting that the Court instruct the jury that, if they find the defendant guilty on either count, they should make a determination as to the amount of cocaine with respect to that count (R1-27-49) [App. p. (37-38)]. The Court refused to give the requested instruction, and the defense made a timely objection (R5-70). This ultimately resulted in the trial Court making a determination as to the amount of cocaine involved in the conspiracy at Badger's sentencing.

In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 106 Sup.Ct. 2411 (1986), the Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, ruled that a state could properly treat visible possession of a firearm as a sentencing consideration rather than an element of a particular offense that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court further held that:

of the evidence, requesting that the Court
instruct the jury that, if they find the
defendant guilty on either count, they
should make a determination as to the
amount of pecuniary loss in respect to that
count (SI-17-18) (App. D. (11-12)). The
Court refused to give the requested
instruction, and the defense made a timely
objection (10-11). This objection
was denied in the trial Court making a
determination as to the amount of pecuniary
loss involved in the conspiracy as charged.
The Court's

IN SMITH v. UNITED STATES, 342
U.S. 449 (1952), the Supreme Court, in
a five-to-four decision, ruled
that a state could properly assert a
possessory interest in a defendant's
commission rather than an interest in a
particular offense that may be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court
thereby held that:

"while there are constitutional limits beyond which the states may not go in this regard, the applicability of the reasonable doubt standard has always been dependent on how a state defines the offense that it has charged in any given case. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 106 Sup.Ct. 2411, 2416 (1986)."

However, the McMillan Court

distinguished those cases where the Act provided for a wide "differential in sentencing". Indeed, the Court took note of Mullany v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 Sup. Ct. 1881 (1975), in which the wide differential in sentencing ranging from a nominal fine to a mandatory life sentence was a key factor in the Court holding that a Maine statutory scheme respecting murder and manslaughter violated due process requirements in that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of heat of passion on sudden provocation when the issue is in a homicide case, rather than requiring a defendant to establish by a preponderance of the

"While there are constitutional limits beyond which the states may not go in this regard, the applicability of the reasonable doubt standard has always been dependent on how a state defines the offense that it has charged in any given case. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 102 S.Ct. 2411, 2416 (1980)."

However, the McMillan Court

distinguished those cases where the act provided for a wide "differential in sentencing". Indeed, the Court took note of McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 433 U.S. 231, 238 (1977), in which the wide differential in sentencing ranging from nominal fines to a mandatory life sentence was a key factor in the Court holding that a Kansas statutory scheme regarding murder and manslaughter violated the proportionality principle in that the prosecution was to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of heat of passion in every prosecution when the issue is in a homicide case, rather than requiring a defendant to establish by a preponderance of the

evidence that he acted in the heat of passion. Mullany v. Wilbur, 95 Sup.Ct.

1881 (1975). The Court in Mullany stated:

Moreover, use of the reasonable doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned ...These interests are implicated to a greater degree in this case than they were in Winship itself (In Re: Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 Sup. Ct. 1068 (1970).) The petitioner there faced an 18-month sentence with a maximum possible extension of an additional four and a half years (Winship at 397 U.S. 360, 90 Sup.Ct. 1070 (1970)), whereas respondent here faces a differential in sentencing ranging from a nominal fine to a mandatory life sentence. Both the stigma to the defendant and the community's confidence in the administration of the criminal law are also of greater consequence in this case.

The Guidelines promulgated by the

evidence that he acted in the best of

passion. Julian v. Wilson, 22 Sup. Ct.

1881 (1875). The Court in Wilson stated:

Moreover, use of the reasonable
doubt standard is indispensable
to maintain the respect and
confidence of the community in
the administration of the criminal
law. It is critical that the
moral force of the criminal law
not be diluted by a standard of
proof that leaves people in
doubt whether innocent men are
being condemned. . . . These
interests are protected in a
greater degree in this case than
they were in Winn. It is
not enough, 337 U.S. 535, 50
Sup. Ct. 1055 (1951). The
Court in Winn stated that an
in-court sentence with a review
possible within 60 days or an
appeal with bond and a full year
to file a writ of habeas corpus
was not sufficient to protect
the defendant's liberty. . . .
The Court in Winn stated that
the defendant's liberty is
not protected by the habeas
corpus writ and the right of
confrontation in this case.

The defendant was found by the

Sentencing Commission have as wide a range applied in a more rigid fashion. In a narcotics case, a defendant can be sentenced to anywhere from a probated sentence to a mandatory life sentence. For possession of cocaine with an admission of guilt, he could be sentenced anywhere from two months to life in the penitentiary.³

In a conspiracy case, where no overt act is required, and where no amount of contraband is referred to in the indictment, the criminally accused is effectively denied his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.

The Sentencing Commission initially sought to develop a "real offense system" as opposed to a charge offense system. The Commission admitted that its initial efforts in this direction, carried out in the spring and early summer of 1986, proved

³ Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, West Publishing Company (1988), pages 62, 63, 216.

Sentencing Commission have as wide a range
 applied in a more rigid fashion. In a
 meretricious case, a defendant can be
 sentenced to anywhere from a probation
 sentence to a mandatory life sentence. For
 possession of cocaine with no admission of
 guilt, he could be sentenced anywhere from
 two months to life in the penitentiary.
 In a conspiracy case, where no money was
 realized, and where no amount of cooperation
 is related to the defendant, the
 criminal is sentenced to effectively death
 his rights under the Due Process Clause of
 the Constitution.
 The Sentencing Commission is
 sought to develop a trial offense system
 as opposed to a static offense system. The
 Commission advised that the initial
 efforts in this direction, carried out in
 the spring and early summer of 1983, proved

Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual
 West Publishing Company (1983), pages 21
 22, 23

unproductive, mostly for practical reasons. In its policy statements, the Commission admits that its sentencing structure could punish a defendant for charges not contained in the indictment.⁴

18 U.S.C. Section 3553B allows the sentencing Court to depart from the Guidelines when it finds an "aggravating or mitigating circumstance" that was not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission.

The defendant's sentence can be greatly enhanced on the basis of charges that are not even included in the indictment. In effect, a person accused of conspiracy to possess one ounce of cocaine could be sentenced to a multiple kilos without having an opportunity to confront the charges.

⁴ Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, West Publishing Company (1988), pages 5, 6.

unproductive, mostly for practical reasons. In its policy statements, the Commission admits that its reasoning structure could justify a sentence for charges not contained in the indictment. In U.S.C. Section 2381(a)(1) the sentencing Court is required to depart from the Guidelines when it finds an "aggravating or mitigating circumstance" that was not adequately taken into consideration by the sentencing Commission.

The defendant's sentence can be greatly enhanced on the basis of charges that are not even included in the indictment. In effect, a person accused of conspiracy to commit an offense of violence could be sentenced to a multiple life without having an opportunity to confront the charges.

There could not be a better example of a defendant losing his right to confront the charges against him in a trial by jury than the case of Royce Boddie Badger. When the trial Court refused to grant Badger's request to have the jury determine the amount of cocaine involved if he were found guilty of any of the charges (R1-27-49) (R5-70, 71), the trial Court effectively reserved the decision whether Badger conspired with Greg James to possess with intent to distribute four kilograms of cocaine. Later, the Court not only ruled that it was a four-kilogram case and not a one-half ounce conspiracy, but by its ruling it also determined that the jury could not have believed that it was a one-half ounce conspiracy case.

This was despite the fact that the jury determined that on March 14, 1988, Royce Boddie Badger was not guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to

There could not be a person capable

of a defendant being in a state of control

the charges against him in a trial by jury

than the case of Joyce Kilmer. When

The trial court refused to grant a verdict

request to have the jury determine the

amount of damages awarded it was held

guilty of one of the charges against him

and the trial court affirmed

the verdict of the jury on the charges against him

consequently the jury found the defendant guilty

of the charges against him and the jury

found the defendant guilty of the charges against him

and the jury found the defendant guilty of the charges against him

and the jury found the defendant guilty of the charges against him

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distribute and not guilty of simple possession of cocaine. This was further complicated by the fact that the trial Court had charged the jury that "the proof need not establish with certainty the exact date of the alleged offenses. It is sufficient if the evidence in the case establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the offenses were committed on a date reasonably near the date alleged in the indictment" (R5-54). The prosecution objected to the closing argument by the defense that in order to find Greg James guilty on a conspiracy charge, "you have to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that Royce Boddie Badger had an agreement with Greg James to distribute four kilos of cocaine, not a payment on an old drug debt" (R5-39). The Court sustained the objection, thus allowing the jury to take into account the possibility of conspiring with Greg James to distribute a half ounce

distributed and not guilty of simple
possession of cocaine. This was further
complicated by the fact that the trial
court had charged the jury that "the proce-
dure had not established with certainty the exact
date of the alleged offense. It is
noting in the evidence in the case
established beyond a reasonable doubt that
the offense was committed on a date
approximately near the date alleged in the
indictment" (182-24). The prosecution
objected to the timing argument of the
defense that in order to find that Jones
guilty on a conspiracy charge, "you have to
believe beyond a reasonable doubt that
Nancy Beattie Sadler had an agreement with
Jones to distribute from 1936 to
1938, not a payment on his old drug habit
(182-21). The court sustained the
objection, thus allowing the jury to find
into account the possibility of conspiracy
and may have to distribute a half ounce

of cocaine (R5-39). The Court further ruled that the government did not have to prove any amount of cocaine (R5-40).

The combination of the facts in Badger's case, the Court's ruling as to the time alleged in the indictment, the Court's refusal that to let the jury determine the amount of contraband in question, the Court's refusal to allow the defense to argue that the conspiracy count should only concern the distribution of four kilos of cocaine, and the application of the Sentencing Guidelines, effectively denied Badger's right under the due process clause to the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to the distribution of four kilos. In effect, he was open to conviction for buying a half ounce of cocaine while being sentenced for distribution of four kilos.

In U.S. v. Quicksey, 525 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1975), the Defendants were

of cocaine (RS-35). The Court further
tried that the government did not have to
prove any amount of cocaine (RS-40).
The combination of the facts in
Badger's case, the Court's ruling as to the
time alleged in the indictment, the Court's
refusal that to let the jury determine the
amount of cocaine in question, the
Court's refusal to allow the defense to
argue that the conspiracy count should only
concern the distribution of four kilos of
cocaine, and the application of the
government's guidelines, collectively harmed
Badger's right under the due process clause
to the standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt as to the distribution of
four kilos. In effect, he was open to
conviction for buying a half ounce of
cocaine while being sentenced for
distribution of four kilos.

In *U.S. v. Gandy*, 718 F.2d 1113
(7th Cir. 1983), the defendant was

charged with conspiracy to violate the Travel Act and with conspiracy to violate the drug laws. The trial Court refused the Defendants' motion to require the government to elect which statute it was relying on. The Appellate Court held that because of the ambiguity, judgment would be withheld so as to give the government time to consent to resentencing under the lesser penalty for conspiracy to violate the Travel Act. If the consent was given, the convictions would be affirmed, but if consent was not given, then the convictions would be vacated and remanded for new trial. U.S. v. Quicksey, 525 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1975).

In U.S. v. Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d 1076 (2nd Cir. 1984), the Court held that, where Count I of the indictment charged a conspiracy punishable under both Sections 841(b)(1)(A) and Section 841(b)(1)(B), with one section covering cocaine and authorizing a sentence of up to fifteen

charged with conspiracy to violate the
Travel Act and with conspiracy to violate
the Smith Law. The trial court refused the
Defendants' motion to require the
government to state which statute it was
relying on. The Appellate Court held that
because of the ambiguity, judgment would be
withheld so as to give the government time
to consent to rescheduling under the issue
penalty for conspiracy to violate the
Travel Act. If the consent was given, the
conviction would be affirmed, but if
consent was not given, then the conviction
would be vacated and remanded for new
trial. U.S. v. Galt, 312 F.2d 1001 (CA-10, 1963).

In U.S. v. Galt, 312 F.2d 1001 (CA-10, 1963), the Court held that
where Count 1 of the indictment charged a
conspiracy punishable under both Sections
84(b)(1)(A) and Section 84(b)(1)(B),
with one section covering cocaine and
authorizing a sentence of up to fifteen

years, and the latter section covering marijuana which allows a sentence of up to five years, "in the absence of a special verdict there was no way for the Trial Court to know whether the jury intended to convict Eduardo Orozco for a cocaine related conspiracy, for a marijuana related conspiracy, or for a conspiracy involving both drugs." The Court held that where there is a conspiracy which charges a violation of a single conspiracy statute, but where the conspiracy has possibly two objects, the Defendant must be sentenced as if he violated the conspiracy with the least punishment. U.S. v. Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d 1076, 1083, 1084 (1984). See also Brown v. U.S., 299 F.2d 438 (DC Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 946, 82 Sup. Ct. 1593 (1962); U.S. v. Noah, 475 F.2d 688, 693 (9th Cir. 1973); U.S. v. Amato, 367 F. Supp. 547, 549 (S.D. N.Y. 1973).

Yeager, and the latter section covering
 sentences which allow a sentence of up to
 five years, "in the absence of a special
 verdict there was no way for the trial
 court to know whether the jury intended to
 convict Edward Green for a cocaine
 related conspiracy, for a marijuana related
 conspiracy, or for a conspiracy involving
 both drugs. The Court held that where
 there is a conspiracy which charges a
 violation of a single conspiracy statute,
 but where the conspiracy has possibly two
 objects, the defendant need be sentenced as
 if he violated the conspiracy with the
 least punishment. U.S. v. Green-Brada,
 332 F.2d 1074, 1081, 1084 (1964). See also
Brown v. U.S., 330 F.2d 410 (DC Cir.)
 cert. denied, 370 U.S. 944, 63 Sup. Ct.
 1293 (1962); U.S. v. Mann, 375 F.2d 688,
 402 (5th Cir. 1963); U.S. v. Adams, 381 F.
 Supp. 917, 642 (S.D. N.Y. 1971).

ARGUMENT

Application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to a case in which a serious factual dispute as to the amount of contraband in question surely affects the defendant's right to a trial by jury.

Badger's trial is unique in that he admitted he was present at the scene of the arrest on the date in question in order to repay a debt involving one-half ounce of cocaine. The government contended, through its informant/agent, that Badger was there to purchase four kilograms of cocaine.

Badger had requested that the jury determine the amount of cocaine involved in the transaction, realizing that the jury might find him guilty to conspiracy on his admission that he had purchased 1/2 ounce of cocaine from the informant/agent.

The jury found Badger not guilty of possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute on or about the date in question, despite the government's claim

ARGUMENT

Application of the Federal

Sentencing Guidelines to a case in which a
serious factual dispute as to the amount of
cocaine is in question surely affects the
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to purchase four kilograms of cocaine.

Badger had requested that the jury
determine the amount of cocaine involved in
the transaction, realizing that the jury
might find him guilty of conspiracy on his
admission that he had purchased 1/2 ounce
of cocaine from the informant/agent.

The jury found Badger not guilty
of possessing cocaine with the intent to
distribute on or about the date in
question despite the government's claim

that Badger picked up the suitcase containing the contraband. The trial court's refusal to allow the jury to state how much cocaine was involved in Badger's conspiracy, and the court's refusal to charge the jury that Badger could not conspire with an agent for the government, in effect deprived Badger of trial by jury.

The trial court's refusal to submit Defendant's interrogatories to the jury, the refusal to charge Defendant's requests pertaining to the conspiracy with a government agent, and the Appellate Court's affirmation of this ruling by the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, constitute a departure from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, such departure presenting an important and substantial question of federal law which should be decided by this Honorable Court.

that Bagder picked up the suitcase
containing the contraband. The trial
court's refusal to allow the jury to state
how much cocaine was involved in Bagder's
conspiracy, and the court's refusal to
charge the jury that Bagder could not
conspire with an agent for the government,
in effect deprived Bagder of trial by jury.
The trial court's refusal to
admit Defendant's interrogatories to the
jury, the refusal to charge Defendant's
requests pertaining to the conspiracy with
a government agent, and the Appellate
Court's affirmation of this ruling by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, constitute a
deprivation from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings, such
deprivation amounting to a denial of
substantial question of federal law which
should be decided by this honorable Court.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above,
Petitioner urges this Court to grant a Writ
of Certiorari to review the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit.

Respectfully submitted

W. MICHAEL MALOOF,
Attorney for
Petitioner
ROYCE BODDIE BADGER

215 N. McDonough St.
Decatur, Georgia 30030
(404) 373-8000

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above,
Petitioner urges this Court to grant a writ
of Certiorari to review the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

W. MICHAEL KALIN,
Attorney for
Petitioner
JOHN EDGAR HARRIS

312 W. McDonough St.
Tomball, Texas 77375
(281) 373-8800

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 85-8541

"IN" NOT

"BUT" NOT

D. APPENDIX, PART 1

Decisions of the 11th Circuit Court

Plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

ROYCE MOORE WILSON,

Defendant-appellant.

Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Georgia

(March 14, 1984)

Before KRAVITCH and CLARK, Circuit Judges
and ROSENBERG, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. (1) See 11th Cir. 85-8541.

Argument heard: April 12, 1984.
For the Court: Miguel S. Cortes,
Clerk.

Deputy Clerk

ENTERED AS JUDGMENT: JULY 13, 1984

APPENDIX, PART I

Decisions of the 11th Circuit Court

(1)

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

----- "DO NOT
No. 88-8666 PUBLISH"

D.C. Docket No. 88-177

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ROYCE BODDIE BADGER,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia

(April 10, 1989)

Before KRAVITCH and CLARK, Circuit Judges
and HENDERSON, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM: AFFIRMED. See 11th Cir. R.
36-1.

Judgment Entered: April 10, 1989
For the Court: Miguel J. Cortez,
Clerk

By: (signature of David
Maland)
Deputy Clerk

ISSUED AS MANDATE: JUN 29, 1989

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

"DO NOT

PUBLISH"

No. 88-8888

U.C. Docket No. 88-117

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

ROYCE ROBERT BAKER,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia

(April 10, 1988)

Before BRANTLEY and CLARK, Circuit Judges,
and HENDERSON, District Court Judge.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed. See 1175 Cir. R.

38-1

Argument Expected: April 10, 1988
in the Court, Miami, D. Fla.

CLARK

BY: _____ of Miami

Attorney

George Clark

ENTERED AS RELEASED: MAY 10, 1988

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

NO. 88-8666

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff, Appellee,

versus

ROYCE BODDIE BADGER,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia

ON PETITIONS FOR REHEARING AND SUGGESTIONS
OF REHEARING IN BANC

(Opinion April 10, 11 Cir., 1989, ____
F.2d)___).

(June 20, 1989)

Before KRAVITCH and CLARK, Circuit Judges,
and HENDERSON, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:

(X) The Petitions for Rehearing are DENIED
and no member of this panel nor other Judge
in regular active service on the Court
having requested that the Court be polled
on rehearing in banc (Rule 35, Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure; Eleventh
Circuit Rule 35-5), the Suggestions of
Rehearing In Banc are DENIED.

() The Petitions for Rehearing are DENIED
and the Court having been polled at the
request of one of the members of the Court
and a majority of the Circuit Judges who
are in regular active service not having

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

NO. 83-858

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff, Appellee,

vs.

ROYCE MOORE BAKER,
Defendant-Appellant,

Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia

ON PETITIONS FOR REHEARING AND SUGGESTIONS
OF REHEARING IN BANC

(Opinion April 10, 11 Cir., 1983)

(June 30, 1983)

Before KENNEDY and CLARK, Circuit Judges,
and HENDERSON, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:

(X) The Petitions for rehearing are DENIED
and no member of this panel nor other Judge
is regular active service on the Court
having requested that the Court be polled
on rehearing in banc (Rule 35, Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure; Eleventh
Circuit Rule 35-2). The suggestions of
Rehearing in banc are DENIED.

() The Petitions for rehearing are DENIED
and the Court having been polled at the
request of one of the members of the Court
and a majority of the Circuit Judges who
are in regular active service not having

voted in favor of it (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure); Eleventh Circuit Rule 35-5), the Suggestions of Rehearing In Banc are also DENIED.

() A member of the Court in active service having requested a poll on the reconsideration of this cause in banc, and a majority of the judges in active service not having voted in favor of it, Rehearing In Banc is DENIED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

(Signature of Thomas A. Clark)
United States Circuit Judge

"ORD-42"

voted in favor of it (Rule 35, Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure); Eleventh
Circuit Rule 35-2. The suggestions of
Rehearing in Banc are also DENIED.

() A member of the Court in active
service having requested a poll on the
reconsideration of this cause in banc, and
a majority of the judges in active service
not having voted in favor of it, Rehearing
in Banc is DENIED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

Signature of Thomas A. Clark
United States Circuit Judge

1964-12

APPENDIX, PART 2

**There are no other opinions under
Supreme Court Rule 21(k)(ii).**

APPENDIX, PART 2

These are the names of the persons who
have been convicted of the crime of

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Northern District of Georgia

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

vs.
RODGE BOBBIE RAYNES

JUDGMENT INCLUDING
SENTENCE UNDER THE
SENTENCING REFORM
ACT

(Name of Defendant)

APPENDIX, PART 3

Case No. CRB-177A

**Judgment Including Sentence Under the
Sentencing Reform Act**

THE DEFENDANT:

I. I pleaded guilty to count(s) _____
(X) was found guilty on count(s) _____ (one)
after a plea of not guilty.

Accordingly, the defendant is adjudged
guilty of such count(s), which involve the
following offenses:

Title & Section	Nature of Offense	Court Number(s)
12. USC 846	Conspiracy to Possess Cocaine with Intent to Distribute.	one

The defendant is sentenced as provided in
pages 2 through 4 of this Judgment. The
sentence is imposed pursuant to the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.

(6) The defendant has been found not
guilty on count(s) _____

I. Court(s) _____ (s)(s)
disposed on the motion of the United
States.

I. The mandatory special agreement is

APPENDIX, PART 1

Indigent including sentence under the
Sentencing Reform Act

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Northern District of Georgia

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

ROYCE BODDIE BADGER

(Name of Defendant)

JUDGMENT INCLUDING
SENTENCE UNDER THE
SENTENCING REFORM
ACT

Case No. CR88-177A

Mike Maloof
Defendant's Attorney

THE DEFENDANT:

- () pleaded guilty to count(s) _____.
(X) was found guilty on count(s) (One)
after a plea of not guilty.

Accordingly, the defendant is adjudged guilty of such count(s), which involve the following offenses:

<u>Title & Section</u>	<u>Nature of Offense</u>	<u>Count Number(s)</u>
21. USC 846	Conspiracy to Possess Cocaine with Intent to Distribute.	One

The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 through 4 of this Judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.

- (X) The defendant has been found not guilty on count(s) Two.
() Count(s) _____ (is) (are) dismissed on the motion of the United States.
() The mandatory special assessment is

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Northern District of Georgia

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

JUDGMENT INCLUDING
SENTENCE UNDER THE
SENTENCING REFORM
ACT

v.

ROYCE WOODIE BAKER
(Name of Defendant)

Case No. CR-84-177A

WILLIAM J. BAKER
Defendant's Attorney

THE DEFENDANT:

() pleaded guilty to count(s) _____
(X) was found guilty on count(s) _____
after a plea of not guilty.

Accordingly, the defendant is adjudged
guilty of such count(s), which involve the
following offenses:

Count	Verdict	Offense
1	Guilty	18 USC 238

The defendant is sentenced as provided in
pages 2 through 4 of this judgment. The
sentence is hereby pronounced as the
sentencing court has no objection.

The defendant is sentenced as provided in
pages 2 through 4 of this judgment. The
sentence is hereby pronounced as the
sentencing court has no objection.

The defendant is sentenced as provided in
pages 2 through 4 of this judgment. The
sentence is hereby pronounced as the
sentencing court has no objection.

included in the portion of this Judgment that imposes a fine.

(X) It is ordered that the defendant shall pay to the United States a special assessment of \$50.00, which shall be due immediately.

It is further ordered that the defendant shall notify the United States Attorney for this district within 30 days of any change of residence or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this Judgment are fully paid.

Defendant's Soc. Sec.
Number:

Date of Im-
position of
Sentence:

265-43-3373

August 17, 1988

Defendant's mailing
address:

(Signature of Robert
L. Vining, Jr.)

880 Fox Chase Lane
Riverdale, GA

Signature of Judicial
Officer

Defendant's residence
address:

ROBERT L. VINING, JR.
US District Judge

Date: August 17, 1988

Defendant: ROYCE BODDIE
BADGER

Judgment, Page
2 of 4

Case Number: CR88-177A

IMPRISONMENT

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a term of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY ONE (121) MONTHS.

included in the portion of this document
that follows a line.
(X) It is ordered that the defendant shall
pay to the United States a special assess-
ment of \$25.00, which shall be due immedi-
ately.

It is further ordered that the defendant
shall notify the United States Attorney for
this district within 30 days of any change
of residence by mailing address until all
fines, penalties, costs, and special
assessments imposed by this document are
fully paid.

Defendant's true name
Address
Date of birth
Division of
Courtroom

U.S. District Court
District of Columbia
August 11, 1954

Defendant's mailing
address
Postmaster at Boston
in witness whereof
I have hereunto set my hand
and the Seal of the Court
at Boston
this 11th day of August, 1954

Defendant's residence
address
Robert J. Young, Jr.
1614 First Street
Boston, August 11, 1954

Defendant's true name
Address
Date of birth
Division of
Courtroom

U.S. District Court
District of Columbia
August 11, 1954

The defendant is hereby notified to the
effect that if he fails to appear before the
court on the date specified in this notice
he will be held in contempt of court and
subject to arrest and imprisonment.

() The Court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons:

(X) The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.

() The defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for this district,

() at ____am/pm on ____.

() as notified by the Marshal.

() The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons

() before 2 pm on ____.

() as notified by the United States Marshal.

() as notified by the Probation Office.

RETURN

I have executed this Judgment as follows:

Defendant delivered on _____
to _____, with a
certified copy of this Judgment.

United States Marshal

Judgment, Page 3 of 4

Defendant: ROYCE BODDIE BADGER
Case Number: CR88-177A

SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be on supervised release for a term of THREE (3) YEARS.

(1) The Court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons:

(2) The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.

(3) The defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for this district.

(4) as notified by the Marshal.

(5) The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons.

(6) as notified by the United States Marshal.

(7) as notified by the institution.

U.S. Marshal

RETURN

I have executed this judgment as follows:

Defendant delivered to _____

with a certified copy of this judgment.

United States Marshal

- Judgment Page 2 of 2

Defendant: JOHN ROBERT WILSON
Case Number: 62-10172

SUPERVISOR RELEASE

Upon release from the institution, the defendant shall be on parole for a term of _____

While on supervised release, the defendant shall not commit another Federal, state, or local crime and shall comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court (set forth on the following page). If this judgment imposes a restitution obligation, it shall be a condition of supervised release that the defendant pay any such restitution that remains unpaid at the commencement of the term of supervised release. The defendant shall comply with the following additional conditions:

() The defendant shall pay any fines that remain unpaid at the commencement of the term of supervised release.

Judgment, Page 4 of 4

Defendant:
Case Number:

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

While the defendant is on probation or supervised release pursuant to this Judgment:

- 1) The defendant shall not commit another Federal, state or local crime;
- 2) the defendant shall not leave the judicial district without the permission of the court or probation officer;
- 3) the defendant shall report to the probation officer as directed by the court or probation officer and shall submit a truthful and complete written report within the first five days of each month;
- 4) the defendant shall answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer and follow the instructions of the probation officer;
- 5) the defendant shall support his or her dependents and meet other family responsibilities;

While on supervised release, the defendant shall not commit another Federal, State, or local crime and shall comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court (set forth on the following page). If this judgment imposes a restriction on defendant, it shall be a condition of supervised release that the defendant pay any costs resulting from the violation of the terms of supervised release. The defendant shall comply with the following additional conditions:

- (1) The defendant shall pay any fine that remains unpaid at the commencement of the term of supervised release.

Exhibit Page 4 of 4

Defendant:
Prosecutor:

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

While the defendant is on probation

or supervised release pursuant to this judgment:

- 1) The defendant shall not commit another Federal, State, or local crime.
- 2) The defendant shall not use a dangerous weapon or controlled substance.
- 3) The defendant shall report to the probation officer as directed by the court.
- 4) The defendant shall comply with all conditions of probation set forth in this judgment and any other conditions of probation set forth in the presentence report.
- 5) The defendant shall remain law-abiding and shall not be a danger to the community.
- 6) The defendant shall not be a danger to the community.
- 7) The defendant shall not be a danger to the community.
- 8) The defendant shall not be a danger to the community.

6) the defendant shall work regularly at a lawful occupation unless excused by the probation officer for schooling, training, or other acceptable reasons;

7) the defendant shall notify the probation officer within seventy-two hours of any change in residence or employment;

8) the defendant shall refrain from excessive use of alcohol and shall not purchase, possess, use, distribute, or administer any narcotic or other controlled substance, or any paraphernalia related to such substances, except as prescribed by a physician;

9) the defendant shall not frequent places where controlled substances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or administered;

10) the defendant shall not associate with any persons engaged in criminal activity, and shall not associate with any person convicted of a felony unless granted permission to do so by the probation officer;

11) the defendant shall permit a probation officer to visit him or her at any time at home or elsewhere and shall permit confiscation of any contraband observed in plain view by the probation officer;

12) the defendant shall notify the probation officer within seventy-two hours of being arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer;

13) the defendant shall not enter into any agreement to act as an informer or a special agent of a law enforcement agency without the permission of the court;

14) as directed by the probation officer, the defendant shall notify third parties of risks that may be occasioned by the defendant's criminal record or personal history or characteristics, and shall permit the probation officer to make such notifications and to confirm the defendant's compliance with such notification requirement.-

These conditions are in addition to any other conditions imposed by this Judgment.

(6) The defendant shall not regularly at a
 lawful occupation unless exempted by the
 probation officer for schooling, training,
 or other acceptable reasons;

(7) The defendant shall notify the
 probation officer within seventy-two hours
 of any change in residence or employment;

(8) The defendant shall refrain from
 excessive use of alcohol and shall not
 purchase, possess, use, distribute, or
 administer any narcotic or other controlled
 substance, or any psychopharmacally related to
 such substances, except as prescribed by a
 physician;

(9) The defendant shall not frequent places
 where controlled substances are illegally
 sold, used, distributed, or administered;

(10) The defendant shall not associate with
 any person engaged in criminal activity,
 and shall not associate with any person
 convicted of a felony unless granted
 permission to do so by the probation
 officer;

(11) The defendant shall execute a probation
 officer to visit him or her at any time at
 home or elsewhere and shall permit
 confinement at any institution observed in
 plain view of the probation officer;

(12) The defendant shall notify the
 probation officer within seventy-two hours
 of being arrested or questioned by a law
 enforcement officer;

(13) The defendant shall not enter into any
 agreement to act as an informant or a
 special agent of a law enforcement agency
 without the permission of the court;

(14) As directed by the probation officer,
 the defendant shall notify third parties of
 their status as co-defendants by the
 defendant's criminal record or personal
 history of conviction, and shall
 permit the probation officer to make such
 notifications and to advise the
 defendant's relatives with such
 notification as required.

These conditions are in addition to any
 other conditions imposed by this judgment.

REQUEST TO CHARGE NO. 11

For an agreement to be punishable,
each of the parties must be subject to
prosecution. In other words, if you find
from the evidence that the defendant
entered into an agreement with a government

APPENDIX, PART 4

agent to violate the law, but did not enter
into an agreement with someone other than

Charges of Trial Court

an agent of the government, then the
conspiracy statute is not violated and you

Requested Charges by Appellant
Court's Ruling That the Amount of Contraband
Is Not Relevant

Presentence Report and Addendum
indicated.

United States v. [redacted] 367 U.S. 325

Marshall v. California, 393 U.S. 444

APPENDIX, PART 4

Charges at Trial Court

Repealed Charges by Appellate

Court's Finding That the Amount of Confession
Is Not Material

Presentence Report and Recommendation

REQUEST TO CHARGE NO. 13

For an agreement to be punishable, each of the parties must be subject to prosecution. In other words, if you find from the evidence that the defendant entered into an agreement with a government agent to violate the law, but did not enter into an agreement with someone other than an agent of the government, then the conspiracy statute is not violated and you must return a verdict of not guilty of the offense of conspiracy charged in the indictment.

Gerbardi v. U.S., 287 U.S. 112.

Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 93.

For an agreement to be punishable,

each of the parties must be subject to

penetration. In other words, at the time

the evidence that the defendant

entered into an agreement with a government

agent to violate the law, but did not enter

into an agreement with anyone other than

an agent of the government, then the

conspiracy statute is not violated and you

must return a verdict of not guilty of the

offense of conspiracy charged in the

indictment.

Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 147.

McIntosh v. California, 101 U.S. 374, 377.

COMING UP THERE AND PAYING OFF ON THIS
DRETT? NOTHING WAS A REPLY ABOUT HAS
TESTIFIED TO THAT, NOT ONE.

REQUEST TO CHARGE NO. 22

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, I
charge you that Greg James became a
government agent in connection with this
case after he agreed to cooperate with the
government.

REPORT TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

FOR THE YEAR ENDING 1900

THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE
COMPANY HAS THE HONOR TO
ACKNOWLEDGE THE RECEIPT OF THE
STATEMENT OF THE MANAGER
FOR THE YEAR ENDING 1900
AND TO REPORT TO THE BOARD
THAT THE SAME HAS BEEN
EXAMINED AND FOUND CORRECT
AND ACCURATE.

(Record, p. 39)

COMING UP THERE AND PAYING OFF ON THIS DEBT?" NOTHING. NOT A SINGLE AGENT HAS TESTIFIED TO THAT, NOT ONE.

THAT'S WHAT REASONABLE DOUBT IS ALL ABOUT, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN.

THERE ARE TWO CHARGES IN THIS CASE. ONE IS THE CONSPIRACY CHARGE. THAT STARTS, ACCORDING TO THE GOVERNMENT, BACK ON THE 9TH, FIVE DAYS BEFORE THIS HAPPENED. YOU HAVE TO HAVE EVIDENCE IN YOUR HANDS AND YOU HAVE TO BELIEVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT ROYCE BODDIE BADGER HAD AN AGREEMENT WITH GREG JAMES TO DISTRIBUTE FOUR KILOS OF COCAINE, NOT THE PAYMENT ON AN OLD DRUG DEBT.

MS. HOWARD: OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR, THAT'S NOT WHAT HE IS CHARGED WITH, THAT'S NOT A CORRECT STATEMENT OF THE LAW.

THE COURT: THAT'S RIGHT. THAT STATEMENT IS NOT CORRECT.

MR. MALOOF: LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, YOU HAVE GOT TO BELIEVE THERE IS AN AGREEMENT TO VIOLATE THE DRUG TRAFFICKING LAWS BETWEEN GREG JAMES AND ROYCE BODDIE

(Signed, E. J. 23)

THINKING OF THEM AND FEELING OUT OF THIS
DENSELY NOTHING. NOW A KNIGHT AUNT HAS
RECEIVED NO THAT NOT ONE.

THAT'S NOT ENOUGH TO SAY IS

ALL ABOUT, LATER AND LATER.

THAT'S NOT ENOUGH TO SAY IS

ONE, ONE IS THE CORRESPONDENCE, THAT

STORY, ACCORDING TO THE GOVERNMENT, THAT

ON THE 17th, THE 17th, THE 17th

REASON, THE 17th, THE 17th, THE 17th

YOUR NAME AND YOU HAVE TO BE THE 17th

REASON, THE 17th, THE 17th, THE 17th

HAD AN INTEREST IN THE 17th, THE 17th

THE 17th, THE 17th, THE 17th, THE 17th

REASON, THE 17th, THE 17th, THE 17th

THE 17th, THE 17th, THE 17th, THE 17th

THE 17th, THE 17th, THE 17th, THE 17th

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THE 17th, THE 17th, THE 17th, THE 17th

THE 17th, THE 17th, THE 17th, THE 17th

THE 17th, THE 17th, THE 17th, THE 17th

BADGER. THIS CASE IS NOT ABOUT THAT HALF OUNCE PREVIOUS DEAL BETWEEN THOSE TWO. IT IS ABOUT THOSE FOUR KILOS OF COCAINE. IF YOU DO NOT HAVE EVIDENCE OF THAT AGREEMENT, YOU MUST FIND HIM NOT GUILTY. IF YOU HAVE A REASONABLE DOUBT OF THAT AGREEMENT, YOU MUST FIND HIM NOT GUILTY, AND THE SAME IS TRUE NOW OF THE OTHER CHARGE, POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE. . IN ORDER TO FIND ROYCE (Begin Record, p. 40) BODDIE BADGER GUILTY OF THAT CHARGE, YOU HAVE GOT TO BELIEVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT HE THOUGHT OR BELIEVED THERE WAS FOUR KILOS OF COCAINE IN THAT BAG, THAT HE KNEW --

MS. HOWARD: OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR. AGAIN THAT'S NOT A CORRECT STATEMENT OF THE LAW OR THE CHARGE.

MR. MALOOF: I THINK IT IS, YOUR HONOR.

MS. HOWARD: THERE IS NO ALLEGATION OF THE AMOUNT IN THE INDICEMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT REQUIRED TO PROVE THAT.

THE COURT: THAT'S RIGHT, YOU DON'T HAVE TO PROVE AMOUNT.

ALL HE HAS TO PROVE IS THE INTENT.

MR. MALOOF: I'M SORRY. I STAND

CORRECTED, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT: POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO
SELL.

MR. MALOOF: YOU HAVE GOT TO BELIEVE
THAT ROYCE BODDIE BADGER HAD THE INTENT TO
DISTRIBUTE THE COCAINE. YOU HAVE TO
BELIEVE THAT HE HAD THAT IN HIS MIND BEYOND
A REASONABLE DOUBT.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THE EVIDENCE
INI THIS CASE POINTS IN ALL THE OTHER
DIRECTIONS. ROYCE BODDIE BADGER COULD HAVE
TOLD YOU A LOT OF LIES. HE ADMITTED TO YOU
ABOUT THE GUN. HE DIDN'T WANT TO HAVE TO
ADMIT TO THAT, BUT IT WAS TRUE. . HE TOLD
YOU ABOUT THE GUN BECAUSE IT IS WHAT
HAPPENED. HE COULD HAVE SAID HE WAS THERE
TO SELL A CAR OR PICK UP (end of Record
page)

ALL HE HAS TO PROVE IS THE INTENT.

MR. WATSON: I'M SURE. I STAND

CONFIDENT, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT: YOU STAND WITH INTENT TO

SELL.

MR. WATSON: YOU HAVE NOT TO BELIEVE

THAT HONORABLE GENTLEMAN HAS THE INTENT TO

DISSEMINATE THE CHARGES. YOU HAVE TO

BELIEVE THAT HE HAS THAT IN HIS MIND BECAUSE

A REASONABLE MIND

WAS IN HIS MIND, THE EVIDENCE

IN THIS CASE POINTS TO ALL THE OTHER

QUESTIONS. WHEN YOU HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT

THIS IS A LOT OF LIES, IT IS EVIDENT TO YOU

ABOUT THE LIES. HE DOESN'T HAVE TO HAVE TO

ADMIT TO THIS, BUT IT IS TRUE. HE WILL

NOT ABOUT THE LIES BECAUSE IT IS TRUE.

HAPPENED. HE DOESN'T HAVE TO SAY HE DOES

TO SAY A LIE IS TRUE OR FALSE.

THE

(Record, p. 55)

ACT. TO ESTABLISH SPECIFIC INTENT THE GOVERNMENT MUST PROVE THE DEFENDANT KNOWINGLY, WILFULLY AND INTENTIONALLY DID AN ACT WHICH THE LAW FORBIDS, PURPOSELY INTENDING TO VIOLATE THE LAW, AND SUCH INTENT MAY BE DETERMINED FROM ALL OF THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THIS CASE.

TO CONSTITUTE THE CRIMES CHARGED IN THE INDICTMENT, THERE MUST BE A JOINT OPERATION OF TWO ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS: AN ACT FORBIDDEN BY LAW AND AN INTENT TO DO THE ACT. BEFORE A DEFENDANT CAN BE FOUND GUILTY OF THESE CRIMES, THE PROSECUTION MUST ESTABLISH BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT UNDER THE STATUTES DESCRIBED IN THESE INSTRUCTIONS THE DEFENDANT WAS FORBIDDEN TO DO THE ACT CHARGED IN THE INDICTMENT AND HE INTENTIONALLY COMMITTED THE ACT.

THE LAW NEVER IMPOSES UPON A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE THE BURDEN OR DUTY OF CALLING ANY WITNESSES OR PRODUCING ANY EVIDENCE. THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN

ACT, TO ESTABLISH SPECIFIC INTENT AND
GOVERNMENT MUST SHOW THE DEFENDANT
KNOWLEDGE, WILLFULNESS AND INTENTIONALLY
HE HAS BEEN THE LAW, IN ORDER
INTENDING TO VIOLATE THE LAW, AND KNOW
INTENT NOT BE DETERMINED FROM ANY OF THE
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THIS
CASE.

TO ESTABLISH THE CHARGE CHARGED IN
THE INDICTMENT, THE GOVERNMENT MUST PROVE
OPERATION OF TWO ELEMENTS: 1. THE
ACT PROHIBITED BY LAW AND 2. THE
THE ACT, FROM A DEFENDANT, IN THE
CRIMINAL ACT, THE DEFENDANT
WAS INTENDING TO VIOLATE THE LAW
WAS UNDER THE DEFENDANT'S CONTROL IN THE
INTENT ON THE DEFENDANT'S PART TO
DO THE ACT PROHIBITED BY THE INDICTMENT AND IN
INTENTIONALLY VIOLATING THE LAW.
THE GOVERNMENT MUST PROVE
EVIDENCE IN A DEFENDANT'S CASE THAT HE
WAS UNDER THE DEFENDANT'S CONTROL IN THE
AND INTENDING TO VIOLATE THE LAW.

CHARGING IN THESE CASES RESTS SOLELY UPON THE GOVERNMENT.

NOW, ALTHOUGH THE ELEMENT OF INTENT TO AGREE TO DO A WRONGFUL ACT MUST USUALLY BE PROVED BY CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. NEVERTHELESS, SUCH INTENT MUST BE ESTABLISHED TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION OF EITHER COUNT IN THE INDICTMENT, THAT IS, CONSPIRACY OR POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE. AND A CONVICTION BASED UPON ASSOCIATION ALONE WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO STAND IN THIS CASE.

(Begin Record, p. 56)

—INTENT OF ONE TO COMMIT AN OFFENSE USUALLY MUST BE DETERMINED BY WHAT WENT ON AT THE PARTICULAR TIME AND PLACE IN QUESTION. YOU CAN'T LOOK INSIDE OF A PERSON'S HEAD AND SAY THAT THEY INTENDED TO DO OR DID NOT INTEND TO DO SOME SPECIFIC ACT. THAT IS NOT POSSIBLE. SO WHAT YOU MUST DO IN DECIDING WHETHER OR NOT THIS DEFENDANT HAD AN INTENT TO COMMIT EITHER OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED IN THE BILL OF

CHANGING IN THESE CASES WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT
THE GOVERNMENT.

NOW, ALTHOUGH THE ELEMENT OF INTENT
TO SECURE TO BE A NECESSARY ACT MUST BE PROVED
BE PROVED BY CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
NEVERTHELESS, SUCH EVIDENCE MUST BE
ESTABLISHED TO SHOW A CONVICTION OF
EITHER GOVT IN THE EXECUTION, THAT IS,
CONSPIRACY OR PROMOTION OF CONSPIRACY
SUPPORTING BOTH INTENT TO DISRUPT AND
CONVICTION BASED UPON ALTERNATIVE EVIDENCE
WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO STAND IN THIS

STATE

(Page 2 of 2)

INTENT TO GOVERN TO BE OBTAINED
USUALLY THIS IS ESTABLISHED BY THE FACTS
AT THE TIME OF THE ACT AND NOT BY
SUBSEQUENT ACTS OR EVIDENCE
VERDICTS MUST BE BASED ON THE EVIDENCE
NO ONE CAN BE CONVICTED OF A CRIME WITHOUT
ACT. THIS IS NOT CONVICTION. NO ONE CAN
MUST DO IN THE MINDS OF THE JURY
EVIDENCE MUST BE SUFFICIENT TO PROVE BEYOND
THE CHARGES - STATED IN THE BILL OF

INDICTMENT, IS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL OF THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CONNECTED WITH THE OFFENSES CHARGED IN THIS BILL OF INDICTMENT AND THEN SAY FOR YOURSELF WHETHER OR NOT HE HAD AN INTENT AND THE GOVERNMENT PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT TO COMMIT EITHER ONE OR BOTH OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED IN THE BILL OF INDICTMENT.

NOW, IN THIS CASE THE DEFENDANT ALLEGES THAT THERE WAS ENTRAPMENT, THAT IS, THAT THE GOVERNMENT LAID A TRAP FOR HIM TO GET HIM TO COMMIT THESE OFFENSES. ENTRAPMENT OCCURS WHEN CRIMINAL CONDUCT IS THE PRODUCT OF THE CREATIVE ACTIVITY OF THE GOVERNMENT; SUCH A THEORY OF DEFENSE RAISED ON THE BELIEF THAT NO ONE SHOULD BE CONVICTED OF A CRIME IF HE WAS EITHER INNOCENTLY SEDUCED BY THE GOVERNMENT AGENTS OR ONE OF THOSE WHOSE RESISTANCE WAS OVERCOME. IF YOU FIND THE GOVERNMENT THROUGH AN INFORMER CREATED THE ACTIVITY CONSTITUTING THE OFFENSE CHARGED AND THE DEFENDANT PARTICIPATED IN ANY CAPACITY IN THE OFFENSE, THEN THE DEFENDANT COULD BE

SAID TO BE ENTRAPPED BY THE GOVERNMENT,
(Begin Record, p. 57) AND IF YOU FIND
ENTRAPMENT, IT WOULD THEN BE YOUR DUTY TO
ACQUIT THE DEFENDANT.

NOW, THE BURDEN OF PROOF BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO EACH ELEMENT OF THE
OFFENSE IS ALSO ON THE GOVERNMENT. AN
INTENT IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE
OFFENSE. THE BURDEN THEN WOULD BE UPON THE
GOVERNMENT TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT A VICTIM
OF ENTRAPMENT OR, IN OTHER WORDS, THE
GOVERNMENT HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING
NONENTRAPMENT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

WHERE A PERSON HAS NOT FORMED THE
INTENT TO VIOLATE THE LAW BUT IS INDUCED OR
PERSUADED BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS OR
THEIR AGENTS TO COMMIT A CRIME, THEN HE
COULD BE SAID TO BE THE VICTIM OF
ENTRAPMENT. THE LAW AS A MATTER OF POLICY
WOULD FORBID HIS CONVICTION IN SUCH A
CASE. IF THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE SHOULD
LEAVE YOU WITH A REASONABLE DOUBT WHETHER
THE DEFENDANT HAD PREVIOUS INTENT OR

PURPOSE TO COMMIT AN OFFENSE OF THE CHARACTER CHARGED WITHOUT INDUCEMENT OR PERSUASION OF SOME OFFICER OR AGENT OF THE GOVERNMENT, THEN IT WOULD BE YOUR DUTY TO FIND HIM NOT GUILTY.

NOW, ENTRAPMENT OCCURS WHEN THE CRIMINAL DESIGN ORIGINATES WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND THEY IMPLANT IN THE MIND OF AN INNOCENT PERSON THE DISPOSITION TO COMMIT THE ALLEGED OFFENSE AND INDUCE ITS COMMISSION IN ORDER THAT THEY MAY PROSECUTE. THE INQUIRY IS ON THE DEFENDANT'S PREDISPOSITION, THAT IS HIS INTENT OR WILLINGNESS BEFORE CONTACT WITH (Begin Record, p. 58) GOVERNMENT AGENTS AND INDUCEMENT TO COMMIT THE CRIMES CHARGED. WHAT IT MEANS IS DID THE GOVERNMENT PRODUCE THIS OFFENSE OR DID THE DEFENDANT HAVE A PREDISPOSITION BEFORE ANY CONTACT WITH THE GOVERNMENT TO COMMIT THIS OFFENSE? IF HE DID NOT HAVE A PREDISPOSITION TO COMMIT THE OFFENSE, THEN THAT WOULD BE ENTRAPMENT. IF HE HAD A PREDISPOSITION TO COMMIT THESE OFFENSES, THEN HE CAN'T BE ENTRAPPED. SO

PURPOSE TO BRING AN END TO THE
CHARACTER CHARGED WITHOUT INCONVENIENCE
PERSUASION OF SOME OTHERS TO ASK
GOVERNMENT. THEN IT WOULD BE YOUR DUTY TO
FIND HIM NOT GUILTY.

WELL, SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE
CRIMINAL RECORDS OFFICER WITH THE
GOVERNMENT AND THEY BRING IN THE WIND OF
AN INDEPENDENT LEGAL INVESTIGATION TO

CONVINCE THE ALLIED COUNTRIES AND INDUCE THE
COMMISSION TO ACCEPT THAT THEY ARE
PROSECUTE. THE CHARGE IS ON THE
DEFENDANT'S INDEPENDENCY. THAT IS THE

INTENT OF WILLINGNESS TO CONTACT WITH
THESE COUNTRIES. THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD AND
THROUGHOUT TO CARRY THE BURDEN OF PROOF
WHICH IT BEARS AS THE GOVERNMENT PROSECUTOR

THIS OFFICE IS THE GOVERNMENT AND
PROSECUTION BY ONE AND THE SAME WITH THE
GOVERNMENT TO CARRY THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS NOT
HAS NOT HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO CARRY THE

OTHERS. THEN THAT WOULD BE RESPONSIBILITY
HE HAS A RESPONSIBILITY TO CARRY THE
OTHERS. THEN HE CAN'T BE RESPONSIBLE. NO

THAT IS WHAT YOU MUST DECIDE AS FAR AS THAT PORTION OF THE CASE IS CONCERNED.

NOW, IN THE BILL OF INDICTMENT -- AND I'M GOING TO READ YOU VARIOUS PORTIONS OF THE INDICTMENT, BUT I WANT TO CAUTION YOU THAT SIMPLY BECAUSE I'M READING IT TO YOU DOES NOT INDICATE THAT I HAVE AN OPINION ABOUT WHETHER THERE IS GUILT OR INNOCENCE IN THIS CASE. I DO NOT. I'M SIMPLY READING THE -- SOME PORTIONS OF THE INDICTMENT TO YOU SO THAT I CAN CONNECT IT UP WITH CERTAIN DEFINITIONS THAT I AM GOING TO READ TO YOU AND HOPEFULLY MAKE IT MORE UNDERSTANDABLE. AND YOU WILL HAVE THIS INDICTMENT OUT WITH YOU WHEN YOU RETIRE TO CONSIDER THE CASE AND YOU SHOULD READ IT TO SEE WHAT IT CONTAINS, ALWAYS KEEPING IN MIND THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS ENTERED A PLEA OF NOT GUILTY TO THE CHARGES IN THE BILL OF INDICTMENT.

NOW IN COUNT ONE IT IS CHARGED IN THIS CASE THAT THIS DEFENDANT AND ONE GREGORY LEROY JAMES DID COMBINE, CONSPIRE, CONFEDERATE AND AGREE AND HAVE AN

THAT IT WOULD BE WISE TO DECIDE TO THE RE THAT
POSITION OF THE LEAD IS ESSENTIAL.
NOW, IN THE BILL OF LEGISLATION -- AND
I'M GOING TO SAY THE SAME POSITION AS
THE INCIDENT, BUT I WANT TO SAY TO YOU
THAT SINGLE REASON I'M SAYING IT TO YOU
DOES NOT MEAN THAT I HAVE AN OPINION
AND I WANT TO SAY IS NOT AN OPINION
IN THIS CASE -- I AM NOT -- I AM
HEARING THE -- SOME POSITION TO THE
INDICATING TO YOU THAT I CAN COME TO
UP AT A CERTAIN POSITION THAT I AM NOT
TO GO TO THE AND THE POSITION IS NOT
OUTSTANDING. AND YOU WILL HAVE THE
THE POINT OF VIEW YOU WILL HAVE THE
COUNCIL AND THE TWO THE POINT OF VIEW
AND WHAT IS THE POINT OF VIEW
NAME THAT THE POINT OF VIEW IS THE
ON THE POINT OF VIEW THE POINT OF
INCIDENT.
AND IN THAT -- IT IS CHANGED IN
THE CASE THAT THE POINT OF VIEW
THE POINT OF VIEW THE POINT OF VIEW
THE POINT OF VIEW THE POINT OF VIEW

UNDERSTANDING (Begin Record, p. 59) WITH ONE ANOTHER THAT THEY WOULD COMMIT A(N) OFFENSE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. THAT IS AN OFFENSE CONTAINED IN SECTION 841(A)(1) OF TITLE 21 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE. THAT IS THAT THEY WOULD UNLAWFULLY, KNOWINGLY AND INTENTIONALLY POSSESS WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE COCAINE, A SCHEDULE II CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, AND THAT THIS IS A VIOLATION OF THE LAW.

I CHARGE YOU THAT A CONSPIRACY IS A COMBINATION OR AGREEMENT OF TWO OR MORE PEOPLE TO JOIN TOGETHER TO ATTEMPT TO ACCOMPLISH SOME UNLAWFUL PURPOSE. IT IS A KIND OF PARTNERSHIP IN CRIMINAL PURPOSES IN WHICH EACH MEMBER BECOMES THE AGENT OF EVERY OTHER MEMBER. THE GIST OR ESSENCE OF THE OFFENSE OF CONSPIRACY IS A COMBINATION OR MUTUAL AGREEMENT BY TWO OR MORE PERSONS TO DISOBEY OR DISREGARD THE LAW. THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE NEED NOT SHOW THAT THE ALLEGED MEMBERS OF THE CONSPIRACY ENTERED INTO ANY EXPRESS OR FORMAL AGREEMENT OR THAT THEY DIRECTLY STATED BETWEEN

UNDERSTANDING (BRAIN RECORD, P. 22) WITH
ONE ANOTHER THAT THEY WOULD COMMIT A(n)
OFFENSE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, THAT IS
AN OFFENSE CONTAINED IN SECTION 2381(a)(1)
OF TITLE 18 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE,
THAT IS THAT THEY WOULD UNLAWFULLY,
KNOWINGLY AND INTENTIONALLY, ENGAGE WITH
INTENT TO DEFRAUD OR OBTAIN A BENEFIT IN
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, AND THAT THIS IS A
VIOLATION OF THE LAW.
I BELIEVE THAT A CONSPIRACY IS A
CONSPIRACY OF TWO OR MORE
PEOPLE WHO ARE TOGETHER TO ATTEMPT TO
ACCOMPLISH AN ILLEGAL PURPOSE, BY A
PLAN OR AGREEMENT, IN CRIMINAL PURPOSE,
WHICH EACH KNOWS BECOMES THE AGENT OF
EACH OTHER MEMBER. TWO OR MORE OR
THE SYSTEM OF CONSPIRACY IS A CONSPIRACY
OR OTHER AGREEMENT BY TWO OR MORE PERSONS
TO VIOLATE OR OBSTRUCT THE LAW. THE
EVIDENCE IN THE CASE HAS NOT SHOWN THAT THE
ALLIED MEMBERS OF THE CONSPIRACY ENTERED
INTO AN AGREEMENT OR UNDERSTANDING
THAT THEY WOULD VIOLATE THE LAW.

THEMSELVES THE DETAIL OF THE SCHEME AND ITS OBJECT OR PURPOSES OR THE PRECISE MEANS BY WHICH THE OBJECT OR PURPOSE WAS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED. LIKEWISE, THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE NEED NOT ESTABLISH THAT ALL OF THE MEANS OR METHODS SET OUT IN THE INDICTMENT WERE IN FACT AGREED UPON TO CARRY OUT THE ALLEGED CONSPIRACY OR THAT ALL OF THE MEANS OR METHODS WHICH WERE AGREED UPON WERE ACTUALLY NEEDED OR PUT INTO OPERATION.

WHAT THE EVIDENCE MUST SHOW BEYOND A REASONABLE (Begin Record, p. 60) DOUBT IS THIS: THAT TWO OR MORE PERSONS IN SOME WAY OR MANNER POSITIVELY OR TACITLY CAME TO A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING TO TRY TO ACCOMPLISH A COMMON AND UNLAWFUL PLAN AS CHARGED IN THE INDICTMENT. AND, TWO, THAT THE DEFENDANT WILLFULLY BECAME A MEMBER OF THAT CONSPIRACY. ONE MAY BECOME A MEMBER OF A CONSPIRACY WITHOUT FULL KNOWLEDGE OF THE DETAILS OF AN UNLAWFUL SCHEME OR THE NAMES AND IDENTITIES OF EVERYONE INVOLVED IN THE CONSPIRACY.

THESE ARE THE DETAILS OF THE CASE AND ITS
OBJECT OR PURPOSE OR THE PURPOSE OF THE
WITH THE OBJECT OF WHICH THE CASE IS
ACCOMPLISHED. THE CASE IS
THE CASE WHEN THE OBJECT IS NOT
MEANS OR MEANS NOT OUT OF THE INVESTMENT
WAS IN THE CASE WHEN THE OBJECT IS NOT
ALREADY EXISTING OR THE CASE IS NOT
ON WHICH THE CASE IS NOT
ACTUALLY EXISTING OR THE CASE IS NOT
WITH THE OBJECT OF WHICH THE CASE IS
REASONABLE. THE CASE IS NOT
THE CASE WHEN THE OBJECT IS NOT
ON WHICH THE CASE IS NOT
NATURAL. THE CASE IS NOT
THE CASE WHEN THE OBJECT IS NOT
INDUCTION. THE CASE IS NOT
WILLING. THE CASE IS NOT
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SO IF A DEFENDANT WITH AN UNDER-
STANDING OF THE UNLAWFUL CHARACTER OF A
PLAN KNOWINGLY AND WILLING JOINS IN AN
UNLAWFUL SCHEME ON ONE OCCASION, THAT IS
SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT HIM FOR CONSPIRACY
EVEN THOUGH HE HAD NOT PARTICIPATED AT THE
EARLIER STAGES IN THE SCHEME AND EVEN
THOUGH HE MIGHT HAVE PLAYED ONLY A MINOR
PART IN THE CONSPIRACY. MERE PRESENCE AT
THE SCENE OF AN ALLEGED TRANSACTION OR
EVENTS OR MERELY SIMILARITY OF CONDUCT
AMONG VARIOUS PERSONS AND THE FACT THEY MAY
HAVE ASSOCIATED WITH EACH OTHER AND MAY
HAVE ASSEMBLED TOGETHER AND DISCUSSED
COMMON AIMS AND INTEREST DOES NOT
NECESSARILY ESTABLISH PROOF OF THE
EXISTENCE OF A CONSPIRACY. ALSO A PERSON
WHO HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF A CONSPIRACY BUT
WHO HAPPENS TO ACT IN A WAY WHICH ADVANCES
SOME OBJECT OR PURPOSE OF A CONSPIRACY DOES
NOT THEREBY BECOME A CONSPIRATOR. IN YOUR
CONSIDERATION OF THE CONSPIRACY OFFENSE AS
ALLEGED IN THE INDICTMENT, YOU SHOULD FIRST
DETERMINE FROM ALL OF THE TESTIMONY AND

EVIDENCE (Begin Record, p. 61) IN THE CASE WHETHER OR NOT THE CONSPIRACY EXISTED AS CHARGED. IF YOU CONCLUDE THAT A CONSPIRACY DID EXIST AS ALLEGED, YOU SHOULD NEXT DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENDANT WILLFULLY BECAME A MEMBER OF SUCH A CONSPIRACY. IN DETERMINING WHETHER A DEFENDANT WAS A MEMBER OF A CONSPIRACY, YOU SHOULD CONSIDER ONLY THE EVIDENCE PERTAINING TO HIS ACTS AND STATEMENTS. HE IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACTS OR DECLARATIONS OF OTHER ALLEGED PARTICIPANTS UNTIL IT IS ESTABLISHED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, FIRST, THAT A CONSPIRACY EXISTED AND, SECOND, FROM THE EVIDENCE OF HIS OWN AGENTS AND STATEMENTS THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS ONE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CONSPIRACY.

NOW, IF IT DOES APPEAR BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT FROM THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE THAT A CONSPIRACY DID EXIST AND THE DEFENDANT UNDER CONSIDERATION WAS ONE OF ITS MEMBERS, THEN THE STATEMENTS AND ACTS KNOWINGLY MADE AND DONE DURING SUCH CONSPIRACY AND IN FURTHERANCE OF ITS

OBJECTS BY ANY OTHER PROVEN MEMBER OF THE CONSPIRACY MAY BE CONSIDERED BY YOU AS EVIDENCE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT UNDER CONSIDERATION EVEN THOUGH HE MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN PRESENT TO HEAR THE STATEMENTS MADE OR SEE THE ACT DONE. THAT IS TRUE BECAUSE, AS STATED EARLIER, A CONSPIRACY IS A KIND OF PARTNERSHIP SO THAT UNDER THE LAW EACH MEMBER IS A(N) AGENT OR PARTNER OF EVERY OTHER MEMBER AND IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACTS OF EVERY OTHER MEMBER MADE IN PURSUANCE OF THE UNLAWFUL SCHEME.

NOW, IN COUNT TWO OF THE INDICTMENT IT IS CHARGED (End of Record page)

(Record, p. 63)

ANYONE TO POSSESS A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE IT. AND I CHARGE YOU THAT COCAINE IS A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITHIN THE MEANING OF THIS LAW.

NOW, A DEFENDANT MAY BE FOUND GUILTY OF THIS OFFENSE ONLY IF THE FOLLOWING FACTS ARE PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT: THAT THE DEFENDANT KNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY POSSESSED COCAINE AS CHARGED AND, SECOND, THAT HE POSSESSED THE SUBSTANCE, COCAINE, WITH THE INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE. TO POSSESS WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE SIMPLY MEANS TO POSSESS WITH INTENT TO DELIVER OR TRANSFER POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE TO ANOTHER PERSON WITH OR WITHOUT ANY FINANCIAL INTEREST IN THE TRANSACTION.

THE TERM DELIVER MEANS THE ACTUAL CONSTRUCTIVE OR ATTEMPTED TRANSFER OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. THERE IS NO NEED TO SHOW A SALE IN ORDER TO PROVE A CHARGE OF ILLEGAL DISTRIBUTION. AND I CHARGE YOU THAT COCAINE IS A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE UNDER THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES.

THE WORD POSSESSION AS USED IN THESE INSTRUCTIONS MEANS EITHER ACTUAL POSSESSION OR CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION. A PERSON WHO HAS DIRECT PHYSICAL CONTROL OVER A THING AT A GIVEN TIME HAS ACTUAL POSSESSION OF IT. A PERSON WHO ALTHOUGH NOT IN ACTUAL POSSESSION KNOWINGLY HAS BOTH THE POWER AND INTENTION TO EXERCISE CONTROL OVER A THING, EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH ANOTHER PERSON, HAS CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF IT. POSSESSION MAY BE SOLE OR JOINT. IF ONE (Begin Record, p. 64) PERSON ALONE HAS ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF A THING, POSSESSION IS SOLE. IF TWO OR MORE PERSONS SHARE ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF A THING, POSSESSION THEN MAY BE SAID TO BE JOINT.

NOW, WHEN YOU READ THE INDICTMENT IN COUNT TWO YOU WILL NOTICE THAT IT CHARGES THAT THE DEFENDANT, ROYCE BADGER, AIDED AND ABETTED BY GREG JAMES, DID CERTAIN ACTS. NOW, THE PURPOSE OF THIS CHARGE IS TO EXPLAIN TO YOU WHAT THE TERM AIDING AND ABETTING MEANS. THE GUILT OF A DEFENDANT

IN A CRIMINAL CASE MAY BE PROVED WITHOUT EVIDENCE THAT HE PERSONALLY DID EVERY ACT INVOLVED IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED. THE LAW RECOGNIZES THAT ORDINARILY ANYTHING A PERSON CAN DO FOR HIMSELF MAY ALSO BE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH DIRECTION OF ANOTHER PERSON AS AN AGENT OR BY ACTING TOGETHER OR WITH THE DIRECTION OF ANOTHER PERSON OR PERSONS IN A JOINT EFFORT. IF THE ACTS OR CONDUCT OF AN AGENT, EMPLOYEE OR OTHER ASSOCIATE OF THE DEFENDANT ARE WILLFULLY DIRECTED OR AUTHORIZED BY THE DEFENDANT AND IF THE DEFENDANT AIDS AND ABETS ANOTHER PERSON BY WILLFULLY JOINING TOGETHER WITH THAT PERSON IN THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME, THEN THE LAW HOLDS THE DEFENDANT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE OTHER PERSON JUST AS THOUGH THE DEFENDANT HAD ENGAGED IN THE CONDUCT HIMSELF.

HOWEVER, BEFORE ANY DEFENDANT CAN BE HELD CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONDUCT OF OTHERS, IT IS (Begin Record, p. 65) NECESSARY THAT THE DEFENDANT WILLFULLY

IN A CRIMINAL CASE MAY BE PROVED WITHOUT
EVIDENCE THAT HE PERSONALLY DID EVERY
THAT IN HIS OWN CHARACTER AS THE CRIME
CHARGED. THE LAW RECOGNIZES THAT
SOMEONE MAY HAVE A PERSON WHO DO THE
HIMSELF MAY ALSO BE ASSOCIATED WITH
DIRECTION OR SUPERVISION IN AN AGENT OF
BY ACTING THROUGH OR WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF
ANOTHER PERSON OR PERSONS IN A JOINT
EFFORT. IN THE CASE OF CRIMINALS OF AN
AGENT, SPECIAL OF THEIR METHODS OF THE
GOVERNMENT AND WILLINGLY DIRECTED BY
AUTHORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT AND IN THE
DETENTION. ALSO AND ASKS ANOTHER PERSON IN
HIMSELF. TO THIS TOGETHER WITH THE FACTS
IN THE OPERATION OF A CRIME. THIS THE LAW
HOLDS THE PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
COMMITTEE OF THE CRIME BECAUSE THAT AS THROUGH
THE CRIMINALS AND AS SUCH IN THE CRIMINALS

HIMSELF
THEY MAY BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
THE CRIMINALS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRIMINALS
IN CRIMINALS AND AS SUCH IN THE CRIMINALS
THE CRIMINALS AND AS SUCH IN THE CRIMINALS

ASSOCIATE HIMSELF IN SOME WAY WITH THE
CRIME AND WILLFULLY PARTICIPATE IN IT.
MERE PRESENCE AT THE SCENE OF A CRIME AND
EVEN KNOWLEDGE THAT A CRIME IS BEING
COMMITTED, ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH
THAT A DEFENDANT EITHER DIRECTED OR AIDED
AND ABETTED THAT CRIME. YOU MUST FIND
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE
DEFENDANT WAS A WILLFUL PARTICIPANT AND NOT
MERELY A KNOWING SPECTATOR.

NOW, ALSO THE LAW PERMITS THE JURY TO
FIND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF ANY LESSER
OFFENSE WHICH IS NECESSARILY INCLUDED IN
THE CRIME OF POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO
DISTRIBUTE AS CHARGED AGAINST THE DEFENDANT
IN COUNT TWO OF THIS BILL OF INDICTMENT
WHENEVER SUCH A COURSE IS CONSISTENT WITH
THE FACTS FOUND BY THE JURY FROM THE
EVIDENCE IN THE CASE AND WHAT THE LAW IS AS
GIVEN YOU IN THESE INSTRUCTIONS.

NOW, IF YOU SHOULD FIND THAT THE
DEFENDANT IS NOT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF
POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE AS
CHARGED IN COUNT TWO OF THE INDICTMENT,

THEN YOU COULD PROCEED TO DETERMINE THE GUILT OR INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED AS TO ANY LESSER OFFENSE WHICH IS NECESSARILY INCLUDED IN THE CRIME CHARGED. THE CRIME OF POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, WHICH IS CHARGED IN THE INDICTMENT IN THIS CASE, INCLUDES THE LESSER OFFENSE OF POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, SIMPLE POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A LESSER OFFENSE OF SIMPLE POSSESSION, (Begin Record, p. 66) AND THE GOVERNMENT MUST PROVE THESE OFFENSES BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, ARE THIS: FIRST, THAT THE DEFENDANT POSSESSED COCAINE, A SCHEDULE II CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, AND, SECOND, THAT THE DEFENDANT DID SO KNOWINGLY AND INTENTIONALLY. THE GOVERNMENT MUST PROVE THOSE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

NOW, ANY VERDICT THAT YOU RENDER IN THIS CASE MUST BE UNANIMOUS. THAT IS THE 12 OF YOU THAT WILL DELIBERATE MUST AGREE UPON THE VERDICT. IT IS YOUR DUTY AND RESPONSIBILITY AS JURORS TO DISCUSS THE

CASE WITH ONE ANOTHER AND TO REACH A VERDICT IN THE CASE IF YOU CAN DO SO. EACH OF YOU MUST DECIDE THE CASE FOR YOURSELF AFTER A FULL CONSIDERATION OF ALL OF THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE AND AFTER CONSIDERING AND DELIBERATING WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE JURY. WHILE YOU ARE DISCUSSING THIS CASE, IF THE NEED BE, DO NOT HESITATE TO RE-EXAMINE YOUR OWN OPINION AND VIEWS AND CHANGE YOUR MIND IF YOU FEEL THAT IS NECESSARY. HOWEVER, I CAUTION YOU THAT YOU ARE NEVER ASKED AND YOU SHOULD NEVER GIVE UP A(N) HONEST BELIEF SOLELY BECAUSE YOU WANT TO GET A CASE OVER WITH OR SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF MAKING A VERDICT. YOUR INTEREST IN THIS IS SEEKING THE TRUTH AND NOTHING MORE IN RENDERING A JUST VERDICT IN THE CASE IRRESPECTIVE OF WHAT THAT VERDICT IS.

I WANT TO CAUTION YOU THAT IF I HAVE SAID OR DONE ANYTHING IN THIS CASE OR COMMENTED IN ANY WAY THAT MIGHT MAKE (End of Record page)

(Record, p. 69)

(HANDS RAISED)

THE COURT: WHEN YOU COME BACK FROM LUNCH, THE MARSHAL WILL TAKE THE ALTERNATES OVER TO THE SPARE JURY ROOM. AND SEE IF WE WILL NEED THEM THIS AFTERNOON, AND THEN WHEN YOU GET BACK WE WILL SEND OUT THE EXHIBITS AND SO FORTH AND YOU CAN START YOUR DELIBERATION.

IF YOU WILL TAKE THEM BACK, MARSHAL. LET'S MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO TAKE THEM TOGETHER TO LUNCH AND I'LL GET YOU IN THE PROPER ORDER. ALL RIGHT, YOU MAY GO TO THE JURY ROOM.


(WHEREUPON, THE JURY RETIRED AT 12:40 P.M.)

THE COURT: I'LL TAKE EXCEPTIONS WHEN WE GET BACK FROM LUNCH IN ONE HOUR IF YOU GOT ANY.

MR. MALOOF: I HAVE TWO OR THREE, JUDGE, THAT IS IT.

MS. HOWARD: (sic) IS THE GOVERNMENT GOING TO EXCEPT TO ANYTHING?

MS. HOWARD: NO.




MR. MALOOF: I COULD DO MINE IN TWO MINUTES.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT, GO AHEAD. I'LL LET YOU DO THEM NOW AND GET THEM OVER WITH.

MR. MALOOF: THE FIRST EXCEPTION, YOUR HONOR, IS THAT YOUR HONOR DID NOT CHARGE THEM ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. YOU DEFINED IT BUT DID NOT CHARGE THEM THAT THE LAW OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SAYS THE GOVERNMENT MUST EXCLUDE EVERY REASONABLE HYPOTHESIS SAVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED.

(Begin Record, p. 70) THE END OF YOUR CHARGE ON ENTRAPMENT, EVERYTHING ON THE ENTRAPMENT CHARGE I THOUGHT YOUR HONOR WAS CORRECT EXCEPT WHEN YOU TOLD THEM AT THE END IN YOUR OWN WORDS WHAT YOU THOUGHT ENTRAPMENT WAS AND YOU DID NOT AGAIN REFER TO REASONABLE DOUBT WHICH WAS THE MAJOR ELEMENT OF THAT CHARGE.


AND FINALLY, THIRDLY, WITH RESPECT TO THEIR CONSPIRACY CHARGE, AS I UNDERSTAND THE LAW, THE CONSPIRACY WOULD HAVE TO HAVE ENDED WHEN JAMES BECAME A GOVERNMENT



AGENT. THAT IS ROYCE BADGER DID NOT
CONSPIRE WITH JAMES AFTER HE BECAME AN
AGENT OF THE GOVERNMENT THAT IS AND I
BROUGHT OUT IN EVIDENCE ON THREE OCCASIONS
THAT JAMES BECAME AN AGENT FOR THE
GOVERNMENT SOMETIME ON THE 13TH OR 14TH AND
THAT THE CONSPIRACY MUST HAVE ENDED BEFORE
THAT POINT AND FINALLY, YOUR HONOR, THE
FACT THAT MY REQUEST TO CHARGE THAT I GAVE
YOUR HONOR, I THINK IT IS EITHER 49 OR 50.

THE COURT: 49.

MR. MALOOF: 49, THAT UNDER THE FACTS
OF THIS CASE, BASED ON THE INDICTMENT, THE
DEFENDANT WOULD BE ENTITLED TO HAVE THE
JURY MAKE A DETERMINATION AS TO THE AMOUNT
OF COCAINE INVOLVED BOTH IN THE CONSPIRACY
COUNT AND THE SUBSTANTIVE COUNT IF THEY
WERE TO FIND HIM GUILTY, MAINLY BECAUSE HE
HAS A RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY ON THE FACTS
AS ALLEGED IN THIS CASE WHERE THE DEFENDANT
HAS ADMITTED TWO-AND-ONE-HALF WEEKS
PREVIOUSLY OF OBTAINING A HALF OUNCE OF
COCAINE FROM GREG JAMES. IF THE JURY FOR
SOME REASON WERE (Begin Record, p. 71)




TO TRY AND FIND HIM GUILTY ON THAT, THEY SHOULDN'T, BUT IF THEY DID, THEN THE DEFENDANT WOULD BE ENTITLED TO HAVE THE JURY STATE IT WAS BASED ON A HALF OUNCE. UNDER THE NEW SENTENCING GUIDELINES, THAT WOULD MAKE A HUGE DIFFERENCE IN THE AMOUNT OF TIME HE HAS TO SERVE, AND SO WE COULD GET A JURY VERDICT WHERE THEY MIGHT, FOR EXAMPLE, FIND HIM GUILTY ON THAT AND WE WOULD NEVER KNOW IT. SO I THINK HE WOULD BE ENTITLED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION TO HAVE THE JURY MAKE THAT DETERMINATION(.)

THE COURT: YOU ARE MAKING THAT EXCEPTION ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE NEW SENTENCING GUIDELINES WILL BE APPLIED BY THE COURT IN THIS CASE ASSUMING THERE IS A VERDICT OF GUILTY?

MR. MALOOF: THAT IS CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. IF THE NEW SENTENCING GUIDELINES ARE APPLIED, THE DEFENDANT WOULD BE ENTITLED TO HAVE THAT OPPORTUNITY.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. I'LL NOTE YOUR EXCEPTIONS.

NOW WE HAVE 55 MINUTES LEFT. BACK UP



HERE THEN I WANT YOU TO GO THROUGH THE
EXHIBITS THEN AT THAT TIME WITH MR. POPE TO
MAKE SURE THE RIGHT ONES GET OUT AND ALL
YOUR EXHIBITS GET OUT. UNLESS THEY ASK FOR
IT, I'M NOT GOING TO SEND THOSE PACKS OF --
THAT COCAINE OUT.

MR. MALOOF: I DON'T HAVE ANY
OBJECTION TO THAT.,

THE COURT: IF THEY ASK FOR IT THEY
ARE ENTITLED TO HAVE IT, BUT I PREFER NOT
TO HAVE THAT STUFF OUT THERE. I (End of
Record Page)



IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)	
)	Docket
VS.)	#CR88-177A
)	Superseding
ROYCE BODDIE BADGER)	

PRESENTENCE REPORT

Prepared For: The Honorable Robert
L. Vining, Jr.
United States District
Judge

Prepared By: Thomas W. Bishop
United States
Probation Officer
(404) 968-0286

Sentencing Date: August 15, 1988

Offense: Count 1: Conspiracy to
Possess Cocaine with
Intent to Distribute.
21 USC 846.

Penalty: Maximum 40 years and/
or a \$2,000,000 fine.

Plea: None. Jury verdict of
guilty to Count 1 on
6/13/88.

Release Status Released on 3/21/88
after posting a
\$50,000.00 property
bond.

Identifying Data:

Date of Birth: January 17, 1964
Social Security
Number: 265-43-3373



Address: 880 Fox Chase Lane
Riverdale, Georgia
30296
F.B.I. Number: 19397HA5
U.S. Marshal
Number: 38891-019
Detainers: None
Codefendants: None
Assistant U.S. Defense
Attorney Counsel
Candice Howard Mike Maloof
1854-B U.S. Court- 215 North McDonough
house Street
75 Spring Street, Decatur, Georgia 30030
S.W. (404) 373-8000
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
(404) 331-5816
Date Report
Prepared: July 13, 1988

(BADGER, Royce Boddie

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PART A THE OFFENSE

Charge(s) and Conviction(s)


1. On 6/13/88 the defendant was found guilty by jury of Count 1 of a 2 Count Indictment.
2. Count 1 charges that from March 9, 1988, to March 14, 1988, Badger and Greg James conspired to possess cocaine with intent to distribute. This was in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846.

Related Cases

3. None.

The Offense Conduct

4. On 3/13/88 Greg James was arrested by the Georgia State Patrol in Randolph County, Georgia for speeding and driving without license. After he was arrested and placed in jail, his vehicle was searched and found in the trunk were 4 kilograms of cocaine in a red cosmetic case. Lab reports reflect that the net weight was 3.986 kilograms of 95% pure cocaine. James agreed to cooperate with the Drug Enforcement Administration and informed them that he had been hired by Royce Badger to deliver the cocaine from Miami. He was to receive \$3,000.00 for the delivery of the cocaine when he arrived, after having received an earlier payment of \$2,000.00.
5. According to reports a vehicle was rented in Atlanta by an individual named Dwan Von Siegal Kornegay on 3/9/88. The car was driven to Miami, Florida for James to use for the delivery of the 4 kilograms of cocaine to Atlanta. Once he arrived in Atlanta, he was to phone Badger.
6. James phoned Badger on 3/14/88 to set up a meeting at Williams Seafood Restaurant in College Park. Surveillance agents observed two men identified as Dwan Von Siegal Kornegay and Royce Badger drive up in a 300 ZX. After the vehicle was parked, Kornegay and Badger exited the vehicle and met with James inside the restaurant. All three were witnessed leaving together. While Kornegay got into the 300 ZX, Badger and James walked to the rental car, opened the trunk, and Badger took a red cosmetic case out and walked back towards the 300 ZX.



Agents then converged and arrested Kornegay and Badger. At the time of the arrest Badger was in possession of a .9mm semi-automatic pistol. He tossed it under the 300 ZX.

(BADGER, Royce Boddie

Page 2)

7. It should be noted that the original 4 kilograms of cocaine in the red cosmetic case had been replaced with "sham" packages, and a small amount of cocaine from the original package was extracted and used in the controlled delivery. All packages were recovered at the time of arrest. Furthermore, prior to James entering the seafood restaurant, he was searched. No monies or contraband was found. After the meeting with Badger and Kornegay, James was again searched and found was \$4,220.00 in currency. James states this money had been received from Badger as payment for the delivery of the cocaine.

8. Badger was indicted for Count 1: Conspiracy to Possess Cocaine with Intent to Distribute; and Count 2: possession of Cocaine with Intent to Distribute. On 6/13/88 he was found guilty as to Count 1 and not guilty as to Count 2. Kornegay was never indicted and is still under investigation. James pled guilty in Randolph County, Georgia, Superior Court and received a ten (10) year prison sentence for the offense of trafficking in cocaine.

Adjustment for Obstruction of Justice

9. No obstruction.

Adjustment for Acceptance of Responsibility

10. Badger denies any conspiracy to possess the 4 kilograms of cocaine and does not accept responsibility for the offense.

Offense Level Computation

11. Count 1: Conspiracy to Possess Cocaine with Intent to Distribute. Base Offense Level: The Guidelines for 21 U.S.C. 846 is found in Section 2D1.4(a) of the Guidelines, titled Attempts and Conspiracies. That section provides that conspiracies involving controlled substances shall have the same offense level as if the object of the conspiracy or attempt had been completed. The conspiracy was possession with intent to distribute 3.98 kilograms of cocaine and can be found in Section 2D1.1(a)(3) of the Guidelines, which is titled Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing, Exporting, or Trafficking (including possession with intent to commit these offenses). The drug quantity table reflects that if the amount of cocaine falls between 3.5 kilograms and 4.9 kilograms, he is to have a base level of 30. 30
12. Specific Offense Characteristics: Under 2D1.1(b)(1), if a firearm or other dangerous weapon is possessed during commission of the offense, he is to receive a 2 level enhancement. At the time of his arrest, Badger was in possession of a 9mm semi-automatic pistol. +2
13. Adjust for Role in the Offense: None. 0

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14. Victim related adjustment: no
victim. 0

(BADGER, Royce Boddie

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15. Adjustment for Obstruction:
None. 0

16. Adjusted Offense Level: 32

17. Adjustment for Acceptance of
Responsibility: None 0

18. Total Offense Level 32

PART B THE DEFENDANT'S CRIMINAL HISTORY

19. No record.

Criminal History Computation

20. The total criminal history points is
0. According to the sentencing table
(Chapter 5, Part A), 0 points estab-
lishes a criminal history category of
I.

21. Career offender/criminal livelihood
does not apply.

Other Criminal Conduct

22. None.

Pending Charges

23. None.

PART C SENTENCING OPTIONS

CUSTODY

24. Statutory Provisions: maximum term
of imprisonment is 40 years.



25. Guideline Provisions: Based upon a total offense level of 32 and a criminal history category of I, the guideline range is 121-151 months.

SUPERVISED RELEASE

26. Statutory Provisions: 3 years.
27. Guideline Provisions: 3 years.

PROBATION

28. Statutory Provisions: Not eligible.
29. Guideline Provisions: Not eligible.

(BADGER, Royce Boddie

Page 4)

PART D OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS

Family Ties, Family Responsibilities,
and Community Ties

30. Royce Boddie Badger was born January 17, 1964, in Jacksonville, Florida, the second of three children born to the union of Dr. Soloman Badger, III, and Joyce Badger Jefferson. His father has been employed with Florida Junior College as a counselor since 1970. His mother, who resides in Decatur, Georgia, is employed by Macy's. They divorced in 1978 when the defendant was 14 years of age. All three boys resided with the father up through high school. Once in high school, the subject lived back and forth with his mother and father. In 1984 Badger moved to Tallahassee, Florida to attend Florida A&M. In 1986, after Badger dropped out of school, he moved to Atlanta, Georgia, and has lived in the metro area since. Both parents have remarried. Both of Badger's

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the first of these is the fact that the

brothers are students in college, one living in Tennessee, the other in Florida with his father. He also has two step-brothers arising from a relationship his father had previous to his first wife. This information was verified through interviews with subject's parents. His mother asked that it be noted that the defendant had a very difficult time with the divorce and it may have had a long term effect on him.

31. Badger has been married once, to Tina Marie Hill Badger on June 6, 1987, in Atlanta, Georgia. They have one child together, Royce, Jr., age one. Subject has two other children born out of wedlock. The oldest is Terry Fulton, age 5, who resides with her aunt in Florida. His other child, Alana Jones, age 2, resides in Vermont, under the guardianship of her maternal grandparents. Subject's spouse is employed with VFW as a telephone solicitor. Badger's wife was interviewed and the above information was verified.

Mental and Emotional Health

32. The defendant denies any prior mental health counseling or treatment. His mother reports he received short term counseling after she and his father divorced.

Physical Condition, Including Drug Dependence and Alcohol Abuse

33. Badger reports he is in good physical condition, never having had a serious accident or illness. He reports that he has both an alcohol and drug problem. He states he first used drugs in 4th or 5th grade, when he started smoking marijuana. He progressed to cocaine in high school and started



free-basing cocaine in college. He stated he last used cocaine in April, and last used marijuana a few days prior to the interview, which occurred on June 15, 1988. As to alcohol, he reports his first use was in high school. He states he has now acquired a taste for it and drinks daily. He has never had treatment but feels he is in need of it.

(BADGER, Royce Boddie

Page 5)

Education and Vocational Skills

34. The defendant graduated from Terry Parker High School in Jacksonville, Florida in 1982, after taking a G.E.D. test in the 12th grade to enter college early. He then entered Florida Junior College for two years. He earned an Associate of Arts degree. In 1984 he entered Florida A&M. He attended for 2 years and withdrew in 1986 after his girlfriend got pregnant. Badger maintained good grades through high school and up to his last two semesters in college, at which time his grades dropped. He states drinking, drugs, fraternity life, and the pregnancy of his girlfriend, brought his grades down. The above information was verified.

Employment Record

35. Badger reports he is currently a self-employed Jack of all Trades, and has been since January, 1987. He earns his income by painting, putting up fences, and general construction work. He reports an average monthly income of \$1,500.00. Prior to January, 1987, he states he was employed with "Bug Killers" as an

The following is a list of the names of the persons who have been elected to the office of the President of the United States since the year 1789. The names are given in the order in which they were elected, and the year of their election is given in parentheses. The names are given in the order in which they were elected, and the year of their election is given in parentheses.

George Washington (1789)
John Adams (1797)
Thomas Jefferson (1801)
James Madison (1809)
James Monroe (1817)
John Quincy Adams (1825)
Andrew Jackson (1829)
Martin Van Buren (1837)
Franklin Pierce (1853)
Abraham Lincoln (1861)

Ulysses S. Grant (1869)
Rutherford B. Hayes (1877)
James A. Garfield (1881)
Chester A. Arthur (1881)
Grover Cleveland (1895)
William McKinley (1897)
Theodore Roosevelt (1901)
Woodrow Wilson (1913)
Calvin Coolidge (1925)
Herbert Hoover (1929)

Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933)
Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953)
John F. Kennedy (1961)
Lyndon B. Johnson (1963)
Richard M. Nixon (1969)
Jimmy Carter (1977)
Ronald Reagan (1981)
George H. W. Bush (1989)
Bill Clinton (1993)
George W. Bush (2001)

Barack Obama (2009)
Donald Trump (2017)

exterminator. This is a company that he and a friend started in college and moved it to Atlanta. He states he earned approximately \$700.00 a month while it operated. He stated they closed the business in 1987 and his friend took all the chemicals with him.

PART E FINES AND RESTITUTION

Statutory Provisions

- 36. Count 1: \$2,000,000 maximum fine.
- 37. A \$50.00 special assessment is mandatory.
- 38. Victim Impact Statement: No victim involved.

Guideline Provisions


- 39. Count 1: \$17,500 to \$175,000.
- 40. Subject to the defendant's ability to pay, the Court shall impose an additional fine amount that is at least sufficient to pay the costs to the government of any imprisonment, probation, or supervised release ordered. Section 5E4.2(i). The most recent advisory from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, dated March 15, 1988, suggests that a monthly cost of \$1,221.00 be used for imprisonment and a monthly cost of \$83.33 for supervision.

(BADGER, Royce Boddie

Page 6)

Defendant's Ability to Pay

- 41. The following outlines Badger's financial situation:



ASSETS

Cash on hand	\$ 500.00
Savings Account	\$ 759.00
Checking Account (Commercial)	\$ 466.00
Checking Account (Personal)	\$ 140.00
*Home (Market Value)	\$70,000.00
1976 Ford Pickup	\$ 1,000.00
1987 Ford Bronco II	\$15,000.00
1964 Thunderbird boat	\$ 800.00
1981 Yamaha Motor- cycle	\$ 1,800.00
Wedding Bands	\$ 1,800.00
Jewelry-Gold Chains	\$ 300.00
Total Assets	\$92,565.00

LIABILITIES

*Balance of mortgage	\$59,700.00
Loan Balance on Ford Bronco II	\$20,024.00
Florida Federal School Loan	\$ 3,700.00
Grady Hospital (Child Delivery)	\$ 200.00
Credit Cards:	
1. Amoco Oil	\$ 185.00
2. Discover Card	\$ 633.00
3. Sears	\$ 1,200.00
Total Liabilities	\$85,642.00

NET ASSETS

\$6,923.00



MONTHLY INCOME

Defendant's Income	\$1,500.00
Spouse's Income	\$ 500.00
Total Income	\$2,000.00

MONTHLY EXPENSES


Citicorp Mortgage Payment	\$ 669.00
GMAC Truck Payment	\$ 465.00
Credit Card Payments	\$ 100.00
Utilities	\$ 153.00
Groceries	\$ 250.00
Insurance (Auto/Health)	\$ 175.00
Transportation	\$ 60.00
Medical	\$ 30.00
Child Support (When Able)	\$ 50.00
School Loan	\$ 50.00
Total Expenses	\$2,002.00

NET INCOME (\$2.00)

On 5/24/88 the Government seized Badger's home as a result of the current offense. The current status of the seizure is unknown.

42. As to Badger's adjusted gross income, the I.R.S. reports the following:

1984 - did not file
1985 - did not file
1986 - did not file
1987 - has not filed



43. The defendants past financial picture is clouded since he failed to file income tax, and since his income from Bug Killer could not be verified. Despite his monthly income and expenses coming out equal, his assets, if sold, should enable him to pay a fine if ordered to do so.

PART F FACTORS THAT MAY WARRANT DEPARTURE

44. None.

Respectfully submitted,

(signature of Thomas
W. Bishop)

THOMAS W. BISHOP
U.S. Probation Officer

Reviewed and Approved:

(signature of William R. Williamson)
William R. Williamson
Supervising U.S. Probation Officer



ADDENDUM TO THE PRESENTENCE REPORT

The Probation Officer certifies that the Presentence Report, including any revision thereof, has been disclosed to the defendant, his attorney, and the counsel for the Government, and that the content of the Addendum has been communicated to counsel. The Addendum fairly states any objections they may have.

OBJECTIONS

By the Government

The Government has no objections.

By the Defense

The defense objections all center on the amount of cocaine involved in the conspiracy. The defense states in paragraph 12 of the objections that, based on a verdict of not guilty on Count 2 and several facts that are outlined in their objections, the only amount of cocaine involved in the conspiracy is the 1/2 ounce of cocaine that Badger admitted to having purchased from James prior to his arrest.

Also under paragraph 12, the defense objects to the probation officer's denial of a 2 level decrease for Acceptance of Responsibility. He states Mr. Badger does admit to the 1/2 ounce of cocaine, which they believe was the amount involved in the conspiracy.

In the last section of paragraph 12 the defense lists his computations based on 1/2 ounce of cocaine and Badger having received a 2 level decrease for Acceptance of Responsibility. He lists Badger's base at 10, gives him a 2 level increase for having a weapon, and a 2 level decrease for



Acceptance of Responsibility, thus giving him a Total Offense Level of 10. He states his guidelines sentencing range would then be 6-12 months.

The Probation Officer still finds the amount of cocaine involved in the conspiracy to be 4 kilograms. This is based on the following factors:

1. The investigation was based on the arrest of Gregory James for possession of 4 kilograms of cocaine on March 13, 1988. After his arrest James agreed to tell the agents who he was to deliver it to and agreed to follow through and deliver it to Badger. At the time of Badger's arrest, according to the agent, he admitted to having known that the cosmetic case was carrying 4 kilograms of cocaine, but he stated he was just holding it for James, even though he later denied it in testimony before the Court.

(Addendum, page 2)

2. The indictment was then initiated, based on the delivery and arrest of Badger.
3. The D.E.A. agents were not aware of the 1/2 ounce of cocaine that Badger admits to having purchased from James prior to the arrest.
4. According to the A.U.S.A., Candice Howard, the trial centered on the 4 kilograms and not the 1/2 ounce which the defendant admitted to having purchased from James.

Therefore, based on 4 kilograms and possession of a weapon, he would have a

10

total Offense Level of 32. Since he denies the 4 kilograms, he would not receive a 2 level decrease. His guideline range is 121-151 months.

CERTIFIED BY

(signature of Thomas W.
Bishop)
THOMAS W. BISHOP
U.S. Probation Officer

REVIEWED & APPROVED BY:

(signature of William R. Williamson)
William R. Williamson
Supervising U.S. Probation Officer

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
LIBRARY
540 EAST 57TH STREET
CHICAGO, ILL. 60637

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CHICAGO, ILL. 60637

STATE OF GEORGIA

COUNTY OF DEKALB

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

I, W. Michael Maloof, depose and say that I am an the attorney of record for Royce Boddie Badger, the petitioner herein, and that pursuant to Rule 28, Rules of the Supreme Court, I served three copies of the attached, corrected Petition for Writ of Certiorari on each of the parties required to be served herein, as follows:

On The United States of America, respondant herein, by depositing three copies for shipment by overnight carrier, in a duly addressed envelope, with shipping fees prepaid, to Candiss L. Howard, Assistant U.S. Attorney, counsel of record for The United States of America, located at 1800 United States Courthouse, 75 Spring St. S.W., Atlanta,




Georgia 30303, on September 15, 1989.

On The United States of America,
respondant herein, by depositing for
shipment by overnight carrier, three copies
in a duly addressed envelope, with shipping
fees prepaid, to the Solicitor General at
his office at Dept. of Justice, 10th and
Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.
20530, on September 15, 1989.

All parties required to be served
have been served.


W. MICHAEL MALOOF

Sworn to and subscribed
before me this 15th day
of September, 1989.





No. _____

IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
October Term 1988

ROYCE BODDIE BADGER,
Petitioner

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent


ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

To: Clerk of the Supreme Court of the
United States

You are hereby requested to
enter my appearance as counsel for Royce
Boddie Badger, petitioner in the
above-entitled action.

Dated this 15th day of
September, 1989.


W. MICHAEL MALOOF
State Bar No. 468500

215 North McDonough Street
Decatur, Georgia 30030
(404) 373-8000

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that I have
this date served copies of the within and
foregoing Notice of Appearance by
depositing said copies to be shipped by
expedient carrier, postage-paid and
addressed as follows:

Candiss L. Howard (3 copies)
Assistant U.S. Attorney
1800 United States Courthouse,
75 Spring St. S.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

United States Solicitor General
(3 copies)
Department of Justice
10th and Constitution Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20530

This 15th day of September, 1989.


W. MICHAEL MALOOF